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NOTES
"ULTRA VIRES" CORPORATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONs-The many articles
dealing with ultra vires which have appeared even so recently as within the last
ten years, most of them emphasizing the hopeless confusion into which the law
on this subject is supposed to have fallen,' would seem to suggest that no new
discussion should begin without some apology or explanation for its existence.
This note is an attempt to clarify this very confusion by means of an analysis
and classification of decisions within a limited portion of the ultra vires field.
Other attempts to analyze and classify ultra vires cases have, of course,
been made. One of the classic -bases of classification turns on the distinction
between a corporation's "power" or "capacity" and its "authority". The dogma
is that where a corporation lacks power or capacity to make a contract, that
contract is, by its very nature, void; but where power or capacity exists, though
authority to exercise such power may have been exceeded in the particular
instance, the contract is not necessarily a nullity.2  The failure of this rule to
clarify any "confusion" is due first, to the fact that there is no well-defined
standard by which the presence or absence of "power" can be determined;
second, to the fact that it leaves completely unanswered the question as to the
effect to be given where the "authority" to exercise existing "power" has been
exceeded. And so, "... out of all the complexity and confusion, three rules
have been formulated as labeling what the courts of all states are doing: (I) If
the contract is entirely executory no court will enforce it; (2) Where the con-
tract is fully executed on both sides, practically all courts hold the contract
valid . . . ; (3) Where . . . fully executed by the plaintiff and benefits
have been conferred on the defendant, the defendant cannot plead ultra
vires . . ."s However, the basic inadequacy of even these rules to explain
the decisions is revealed by the very next sentence of the article from which
the foregoing quotation has been extracted: "The cases in the partly executed
region are in great confusion . . . wherever the contract is upheld, it is
usually on the grounds that the defendant is estopped to deny the validity of
the contract . . ." 4 Thus, the conclusion is that confusion continues to reign,
with the only guide suggested being that of "estoppel". But this concept, too,
fails to clarify the confusion, because its meaning shifts from case to case, so
that the complete uncertainty as to how a court will react to a particular factual
situation is not at all mitigated.
-The very statement of the problem, however, seems to suggest the key to
its solution. Conceding that the concepts, "power", "estoppel", etc., have not
been consistently applied by the courts, does this mean that the decisions are in
I. Ballantine, Proposed Revision of the Ultra Vires Doctrine (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q.
453; Kefauver, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires (1927) 6 TENN. L. REV. 20, at 21; Richards,
The Doctrine of Ultra Vires with a Consideration of Wisconsin Decisions (1925) 3 Wis. L.
REV. 129; Carpenter, Should the Ultra Vires Doctrine Be Discarded? (1923) 33 YALE L.
J. 49; Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doc-
trine (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 297.
2. 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (931) §§ 3467, 3468,
3469; 2 MACHEi, THE MODERN LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1908) § IoiS; Note (1923)
7 MINN. L. REV. 332; Kefauver, supra note I, at 22; Note (1926) I WASH. L. REV. 200.
3. Kefauver, supra note I, at 30, 31. See also FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 3459,
3468, 3497; Rollison, The Ultra Vires Doctrine in Alabama (1927) 3 A.LA. L. J. 16; Note
(1926) 1 WASH. L. REV. 200.
4. Kefauver, supra note I, at 31. See also Note (923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 332, at 334;
Note (1926) I WASH. L. REV. 200, at 201; Rollison, supra note 3.
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fact inconsistent and in confusion? To answer in the affirmative is to assume
that courts, in consenting or refusing to apply a concept in a given case, have
been motivated by nothing more than the words used to express the concept,
so that the ultimate decision is purely a matter of chance. On the other hand,
it is quite possible that judges, before deciding to apply or not to apply a given
concept, have carefully considered the case on its merits, have determined what
result should be reached, and have then applied that concept or rule which
would bring about this pre-determined result. Viewed in this light, there is
presented the hitherto unanswered question, "Is it possible to deduce from the
cases a set of factors and considerations which are uniformly applied by most
courts in reaching their decisions, and in the light of which most, if not all, the
decisions will be found to be logical and consistent?" It is to an attempt to
answer this question that our attention is now directed.
I. Where a Corporation's Credit Is Extended for the Benefit of Some Third
Person.
A. The Effect of Knowledge of the Person Relying on the Corporation's Promise
Suppose that A has loaned money to B or sold him goods on credit, relying
on the C corporation's gratuitous guaranty of B's credit. Is the C corporation
liable to A in case of B's default? Where A, at the time of the transaction,
knew of its accommodation character, all courts have refused to hold the cor-
poration liable.' Even where the corporation's promise was in the form of its'
signature as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser on a negotiable instrument, the
same result has been reached," the courts refusing to apply the Negotiable
Instruments Law by which an accommodation party is made liable to a holder
for value "notwithstanding the fact that such holder, at the time of taking the
instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party". 7 The Act is said
to have no application to ultra vires transactions. On the other hand, where
the plaintiff had purchased the instrument before maturity, for value, and with-
out knowledge of its accommodation character the courts have, with equal
unanimity, held the corporation liable.8 Why should the factor of the plaintiff's
knowledge, which the Negotiable Instruments Law has, in effect, said is im-
material, bear such great weight in the cases cited? One court throws out a
hint: "Primarily, the rights of the stockholders and creditors of the indorsing
corporation are to be considered. These rights cannot be jeopardized by
unauthorized acts . . ." ' This indicates an appreciation of the fact that to
say that a "corporation" has pledged its credit, merely means that a board of
directors has attempted to subject to liability assets as to which shareholders
and creditors are the interested parties. On the other hand, they cannot over-
look the fact that the plaintiff is one who has parted with assets in reliance on
the promise of the directors to whom both shareholders and creditors have
intrusted the management of the corporation. Whichever decision is reached,
someone must suffer. Where the plaintiff is a holder in good faith, a decision
5. New Hampshire National Bank v. Garage Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 84o (1929) ;
Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. New England Pie Co., 201 Mich. 407, 167 N. W. 943 (1918);
Rosenberg v. Bekenstein, 211 App. Div. 791, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 309 (ist Dep't 1925) ; National
Bank v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 172 Atl. 131 (Pa. 1934).
6. New Hampshire National Bank v. Garage Co.; Rosenberg v. Bekenstein; National
Bank v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., all supra note 5.
7. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 29.
8. Henderson Lumber Co. v. Chatham Bank & Trust Co., 33 Ga. App. 196, 125 S. E. 867
(1924) ; Central Trust Co. v. Smurr & Kamen Machine Co., 191 Ill. App. 613 (1915) ; Monu-
ment National Bank v. Globe Works, IOI Mass. 57 (1869).
9. First National Bank of Rushford v. Galloway Bros. & Co., 193 Iowa 1145, at 1147,
188 N. W. 8o3, at 8o4 (1922).
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in favor of the corporation would mean that no person could purchase with
safety any commercial paper of corporations. Since the effect of such a decision
would be to limit materially the corporation's credit, thus causing an injury
which might be greater than the immediate one which a judgment for the
plaintiff would entail, the courts allow the plaintiff to recover. On the other
hand, to bar from recovery a plaintiff who had taken the corporation's instru-
ment with knowledge of its accommodation character would limit the corpora-
tion's credit in a relatively small number of cases, most of which would be those
which it is desirable to discourage anyway. Here, therefore, the decisions favor
the corporation.
In the cases hitherto cited, the "knowledge" which prevented the plaintiff
from recovering was knowledJge that the accommodating corporation had re-
ceived no consideration for its undertaking; actual knowledge that the directors
were exceeding their authority in executing such an obligation was held to be
unnecessary.' 0 Without discussion, the courts bridge the gap from knowledge
of the accommodation character of the promise to knowledge that it was unau-
thorized, apparently on the assumption that such knowledge would warn the
ordinary business man to make further inquiry into the extent of the directors'
authority. But even actual knowledge of the accommodation character of the
promise has not always been required. Where the purchaser of the corpora-
tion's obligation, or the person extending credit in reliance on its obligation,
had actual knowledge only of facts from which he might have inferred that it
had been given without consideration, he was barred from recovery. Thus,
where an officer of the corporation indorsed a corporate instrument to his per-
sonal creditor as payment of a persoi.al debt,"- or where an officer indorsed
an instrument payable to himself, executed in the corporation's name and signed
by himself as officer,'2 the indorsee was barred from recovery. On the other
hand, where the corporation's name was signed by another officer of the cor-
poration as well as the one who had indorsed the instrument to the plaintiff,
recovery was allowed.' Where any person, corporate officer or not, delivers
in return for a loan an instrument made by the corporation, on which the
lender is himself the payee, such lender is charged with knowledge that the
borrower may not have paid the corporation for it; '4 and where an instrument
is payable to the borrower, but bears the corporation's indorsement at the time
it is delivered to the lender, the latter is charged with knowledge that this is an
accommodation indorsement. 5
B. Effect of "Benefit" to the Corporation
Conceding that when a corporation's credit is extended for the benefit of
some third person, it may be liable to a bona fide plaintiff, the next question is
"When may it be liable to one who had known of the circumstances surrounding
the making of the corporation's promise"? If the real reason for denying
recovery to the plaintiff with knowledge is the courts' desire to protect share-
1o. New Hampshire National Bank v. Garage Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 840 (1929) ;
Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. New England Pie Co., 201 Mich. 407, 167 N. W. 943 (1918);
Rosenberg v. Bekenstein, 211 App. Div. 791, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 3o9 (Ist Dep't 1925) ; National
Bank v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 172 Atl. 131 (Pa. 1934).
ii. Wheeler v. Home Savings & State Bank, 188 Ill. 34, 58 N. E. 598 (igoo).
12. Luden v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 146 Ga. 284, 91 S. E. io2 (1916).
13. Henderson Lumber Co. v. Chatham Bank & Trust Co., 33 Ga. App. 196, 125 S. E.
867 (1924).
14. Black Hawk National Bank v. Monarch Co., 201 Iowa 240, 2o7 N. W. 121 (1926).
15. Bell Bros. Co. v. American Securities Co., 36 Ga. App. 340, 136 S. E. 541 (1927) ;
First National Bank of Rushford v. Galloway Bros., 193 Iowa 1145, 188 N. W. 803 (1922) ;
New Hampshire National Bank v. Garage Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 84o (1929).
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holders and creditors from suffering an injury which is not one normally
incident to the corporation's business, then it would seem that where the cir-
cumstances were such that the guaranty transaction could reasonably have
been expected to benefit the corporation in proportion to the obligation assumed
by it, it should be liable. The cases unanimously support that proposition.
Some purport to go on the ground that where such possibility of benefit exists,
the contract is not ultra vires; 16 others, that it is ultra vires, but that the cor-
poration should be estopped to deny its liability; 1 7 while still others, as if to
demonstrate that the words "ultra vires" and "estoppel" are merely used to
describe the already-reached result, say that the contract is not ultra vires, but
even if it is, then the corporation should be estopped.18 Real difficulty arises,
however, in the application of the general principle to particular cases. The
cases turning on an application of this principle represent, perhaps, a greater
degree of "confusion" than does any other single group of cases discussed in
this note. Yet, because they are so numerous, they constitute one of the most
important groups. An attempt has, therefore, been made to classify a repre-
sentative number of them.
(I) Where the Expectable Benefit Is Measurable With Certainty at the Tine
of the Guaranty Contract
The general rule in the following group of cases is that the corporation's
responsibility will be limited to the amount of benefit which it expects to gain
as a result of the guaranty transaction. Thus, where the guaranty enables a
debtor of the corporation to borrow money from some third person, with which
it is expected that he will pay his debt to the corporation, all courts hold the
corporation liable to the extent of such debt."9 In the cases cited, the debtor
had in fact paid his debt to the corporation, so that it had actually received as
great a benefit as it had expected to receive. The net result of the transaction,
therefore, was to leave the corporation with no loss other than an unpaid,
delinquent account on its hands, which is one of the losses normally incident to
most businesses. No case has arisen in which the debtor, having borrowed the
money, failed to pay his debt to the corporation. In the light of the cases
hereinafter discussed, however, it would seem that practically all courts would,
even in such a case, hold the corporation liable.
Where the purpose of the guaranty is to enable V to purchase from S
merchandise, which V is in turn to sell to the corporation for use in its business,
all courts again hold the corporation liable.
2 0  Here there is more opportunity
for the corporation to suffer a real injury than in the previous case. If the
16. Kennemer-Willis Grocery Co. v. Hacker, 225 Ala. 415, 143 So. 821 (1932) ; Simpson
v. Bergman, 125 Cal. App. I, 13 P. (2d) 531 (932).
17. McCornick & Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 304 Mo. 270, 263 S. W. 152 (1924) ; see Rounds
& Porter Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 65 Okla. 172, 153 Pac. 648 (915).
18. In re Prospect Leasing Co., 250 Fed. 707 (C. C. A. 2d, I918) ; Becker Provision Co.
v. Parker Hardware Co., 146 Ark. 539, 226 S. W. 177 (1920) ; London & Lancashire Indem-
nity Co. v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co., 112 Ohio St. 136, 147 N. E. 329 (1925) ; Eddleman
v. Wofford, 217 S. W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
i9. Citizens National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196 (1910); Kennemer-Willis Grocery
Co. v. Hacker, 225 Ala. 415, 143 So. 821 (1932) ; La Grange Lumber & Supply Co. v. Farm-
ers and Traders Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409, 140 S. E. 766 (927); Eddleman v. Wof-
ford, 217 S. W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; Binge v. Gulf Coast Orchards Co., 67 S. W. (2d)
io45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
20. Irwin v. Colburn, 56 Cal. App. 41, 204 Pac. 557 (192); Whitehead v. American
Lamp & Brass Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 581, 62 Ati. 554 (1905); Norfolk Mattress Co., Inc.
v. Royal Mfg. Co., Inc., 16o Va. 623, 169 S. E. 586 (933) ; American National Bank v.
Kushner, 174 S. E. 777 (Va. 1934).
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corporation does in fact receive the merchandise from V, and if the directors
are careful not to pay V before he pays S, then there cannot be any loss, for
their payment to S on the guaranty contract after V's default would simply
amount to payment for the merchandise which V had previously delivered to
them. But if the directors should pay V for the merchandise, and if he should
subsequently become insolvent without having paid S, then, if the corporation
is held liable, it would be paying tvice for the same merchandise, and its only
remedy would be an action for reimbursement -against the insolvent V. In the
one case in which this problem arose, the corporation was held liable to S.
2 1
This decision squarely brings out the point that where the expectable benefit
has failed to materialize, the corporation may, nevertheless, be held liable. Nor
is the decision unduly harsh on the corporation. Its interests could easily have
been protected if the directors had not paid V until he had paid S, and, though
shareholders may not always be required to bear the risk of their directors'
unauthorized acts, the risk of careless or imprudent acts is better placed on
them than on third persons dealing with the directors.
Where a corporation pledges its credit for the benefit of one of its own
creditors, the same problem is presented. Thus, where the corporation, being
indebted to its president, gave a chattel mortgage as security for a debt owed
by the president to a bank, the mortgage was held to be enforceable.2
2 The
court said that since the corporation could have properly given the mortgage
to the president who in turn could have assigned it to the bank, it had simply
done directly what might have been done in a more roundabout fashion. The
real explanation for the decision, however, is found in the fact that by giving
this mortgage, the corporation was discharging a debt which it owed the presi-
dent; and if the amount of this debt was as much as or more than the amount
of the mortgage, then the benefit was commensurate with it.
Another type of case in which a benefit to the corporation is definitely
measurable and certain to materialize is where it agrees to pay the debt of
another, in return for which one of its own creditors discharges a debt owed
him by the corporation. Here, too, the cases clearly reveal that the corpora-
tion's responsibility is limited to the amount of benefit bargained for--i. e., the
amount of the debt so discharged. Thus, where the corporation was a party to
a refinancing agreement as a result of which its own indebtedness was reduced
from $i68,ooo to $6o,ooo, and it gave its guaranty of another's indebtedness
of $40,000, the guaranty was held binding.
23 By the same token, where two
corporations borrowed money jointly, each binding itself to repay the entire
loan, each was held liable only to the extent that it had shared in the proceeds
of the loan.2 4 Where, however, a corporation entered into an agreement with
four other firms, whereby they were to pool all their assets for the payment of
all their debts, and one of the other four became insolvent, the corporation was
not held liable for the insolvent's debts.
2 5  Since none of the corporation's
creditors had released it from any of its debts, the only possible benefit was
the agreement of the other firms to pay the corporation's debts; but since, at the
time of the agreement, all four were in failing circumstances, whereas the cor-
poration was prospering, the chances were heavily against such benefit ever
materializing.
2 1
21. Whitehead v. American Lamp & Brass Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 58i, 62 Atl. 554 (905).
22. Bank v. Flour Co., 41 Ohio St. 552 (i885).
23. Granite Hall Farms Corp. v. Virginia Trust Co., 154 Va. 333, 153 S. E. 841 (i93o).
24. North Side Railway Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 30 S. W. 1055 (i895).
25. Kaplan Dry Goods Co. v. Sanger, 214 S. W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. ig9g).
26. An argument which might have been made on behalf of the creditors in this case is
discussed infra note 68.
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An unusually clear insight into the philosophy underlying the decisions
heretofore discussed is given by the following group of cases. Where there
was no possibility of benefit to the corporation, and the plaintiff had known of
the accommodation character of its promise, but where it was protected against
ultimate loss by an indemnity agreement of a third person, the plaintiff was
permitted to recover. The court stressed the fact that under a contrary holding,
the plaintiff would be remediless, whereas, by holding as they do, he recovers
at no loss to the corporation. -7  If the indennitor were insolvent a different
result would probably be reached. In two other cases the existence of such
indemnity agreements materially influenced the decisions, although there was
also some expectable benefit to the corporation.2" Thus it clearly appears that
when accommodation contracts are not enforced in favor of plaintiffs with
knowledge, it is not because of some inherent defect in the contract, but simply
because the courts wish to protect shareholders and creditors again loss; for
here, where the only new fact is the existence of an indemnity agreement which
forms no part of the accommodation contract in suit the transaction is no longer
ultra vires.
(2) Where the Expectable Benefit Is Not Measurable With Certainty at the
Time of the Contract
The basic difference between the cases now to be considered and those
discussed in subsection (I) can best be seen by comparing the following cases.
It has already been noted that where the purpose of a guaranty is to enable a
debtor of a corporation to borrow money with which to pay a debt owed the
corporation, the guaranty is enforceable, at least to the extent of the debt. Here
the expected benefit to the corporation is measurable with absolute certainty.
On the other hand, where the corporation guarantees the payment of a debt owed
by its debtor to another of his creditors, in order to gain an extension of time by
the other creditor, and thus improve the corporation's chances of collecting its
own debt, the value of the benefit, which here consists only of the improved
opportunity for collecting a debt, is conjectural. It is true that at the time of
suit against the corporation, the amount of benefit actually received by it might
be ascertained with arithmetic precision. But suppose that such benefit is con-
siderably less than the amount of the guaranty obligation-should the corpora-
tion's liability be limited to the benefits actually received? With perfect unanim-
ity the courts have answered this question in the negative. Thus, where the pur-
pose of the guaranty was to induce an extension of time as above described, one
case refused to hold the corporation liable at all, despite the fact that it had col-
lected an additional $I2,0o0 on its own claim against the debtor, since the time of
the guaranty and extension agreement.25 On the other hand, two recent cases have
held the corporation liable, making no reference to the amount which it had been
enabled subsequently to collect on its claim.30 These cases clearly indicate that
the actual realization of benefit by the corporation is of no importance in deter-
mining its responsibility, and this view is borne out by the cases hereinafter cited.
27. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cascade Construction Co., io6 Wash. 478,
i8o Pac. 463 (i919).
28. McCornick & Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 304 Mo. 270, 263 S. W. 152 (1924) ; Creditors'
Claim & Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan & Trust Co., 81 Wash. 247, 142 Pac. 67o (94).
29. Deaton Grocery Co. v. International Harvester Co., 1o5 S. W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App.
1907).
3o. Fremont National Bank v. Ferguson, 255 N. W. 39 (Neb. 1934) ; Mercy v. A. 1. Hall
& Son, 31 P. (2d) ioo9 (Wash. 1934).
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By taking the view just indicated, the courts appear to have rejected a
relatively simple method of measuring the responsibility of corporations in this
type of case in favor of one which opens the door to uncertainty and confusion,
for it is obvious that there can be no simple, easy method for determining when
a mere chance or opportunity to benefit in the future is commensurate with a
given obligation. Why has this been done? Probably the answer will be found
in the unwillingness of the courts to give a corporation the chance of profit
without the corresponding risk of loss. It might be objected that such a view
overlooks the fact that shareholders and creditors might thus be injured as a
result of an unauthorized transaction. But this objection merely raises the
whole problem of what risk shareholders must assume for transactions of the
board of directors. If a contract is one which at the time of its execution
appeared to the directors to be good business policy, should shareholders or
creditors be heard to complain? It seems fair that the risk of the directors'
mistakes of judgment should properly fall on shareholders, rather than on
third persons dealing with those directors. From this reasoning it would follow
that any contract of guaranty which, in the light of all the circumstances sur-
rounding its execution, could have been regarded as fair by a reasonable board
of directors, will be upheld by the courts.
It is impossible, however, to find an express statement of this or any con-
sistently applied principle in the cases. 31 But the decisions do reveal that the
conclusion just reached is the test which is actually applied by the courts. Thus,
where a lumber corporation became surety on a building contractor's bond in
order to enable him to secure a construction contract, expecting him to purchase
from it all the lumber needed for the job, such surety contract was held
binding.3 2 But in another case, in which it appeared that the penal sum of the
bond was $700,000 while the corporation's net assets amounted only to $175,000,
the corporation was held not liable on its surety contract. 33 The decision was
obviously influenced by the fact that the contingent obligation assumed was so
great that, if it should ever have become absolute, it would have more than
swallowed up all the corporation's assets, and that, for this reason, no reasonable
board of directors would have bound the corporation to such an agreement.
One factor which is highly important in determining whether or not the
transaction could have been regarded as fair is the degree of probability that
the expected benefit to the corporation will in fact materialize. Thus, in the
cases cited above,34 in which the purpose of the guaranty contract was to gain
an extension of time for a debtor of the corporation, the financial condition of
the debtor is a material fact, for the corporation's chances of collecting its own
debt would, in part, depend upon this. This factor appears to be particularly
significant in a group of cases in which the purpose of the guaranty was to
promote the business which the corporation was authorized to transact. Thus,
where the purpose was to enable the person whose credit was thereby guaranteed,
31. Though scattered hints may be found. Thus, in Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183
Cal. 497, 191 Pac. 905 (I92O) the court says that the question whether or not a guaranty is
"essential to the successful prosecution of the business" or "tends directly to promote the
business authorized by its articles and which it is doing" is one which "is to be primarily de-
termined by the corporation, or those to whom the management of its affairs is intrusted.
The court cannot determine that it is beyond the powers of the corporation unless it clearly
appears to be so as a matter of law". Otherwise, the only help given by the cases is the usual
statement that the liability of the corporation depends upon whether the expected benefit is
"direct and immediate, or indirect and remote", which seems to be the basis of classification
of the cases cited in Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore; supra at 5o1, 191 Pac. at 907.
32. Simpson v. Bergman, 125 Cal. App. I, 13 P. (2d) 531 (1932) ; Rounds & Porter Lum-
ber Co. v. Thompson, 65 Okla. 172, 153 Pac. 648 (1915).
33. Globe Indemnity Co. v. McCullom, 313 Pa. 135, 169 Atl. 76 (1933).
34. Supra notes 29, 30.
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to purchase from the corporation the kind of merchandise which it was author-
ized to sell, and he was bound by contract to purchase such merchandise from
it, the guaranty was held binding."5 Where no such contract existed, but the
guaranty enabled the person whose credit was guaranteed to secure a contract
with a third person, the performance of which would require the kind of
merchandise which the corporation was authorized to sell, one case held the
guaranty binding, 6 though another refused so to hold. 7 The significance of
the contract in these cases lies in the fact that it increases the degree of cer-
tainty that the lierson whose credit was guaranteed will require the corpora-
tion's products, and, being grateful for the favor thus done him, he is very
likely to satisfy his requirements by purchasing from the corporation. Where
neither kind of contract existed, but the purpose of the guaranty was to enable
a person to embark in or continue to remain in the business of selling the kind
of products which it was the corporation's business to sell, two cases have held
the corporation liable,s while a third barred the plaintiff from recovery."9
But where the guaranty was executed in favor of one engaged in selling the
same kind of products as the corporation, in order to enable one of its cus-
tomers to purchase goods from this competitor, the guaranty was not enforced,4
for such a transaction would have benefited the competitor, rather than the
corporation, itself. In those cases in which the corporation did not seek to aid
a competitor, the expected benefit to the corporation is relatively certain to
materialize. In the first place, the persons from whom the benefit is expected
is engaged in the business of selling the kind of goods which it is the cor-
poration's business to sell, so that he is likely to require such goods; and, in
the second place, being the recipient of the corporation's bounty, he is likely to
purchase from it all his requirements. Perhaps it is the absence of these two
facts in the much-cited case of Davis v. The Old Colony Railway "I which is the
real explanation for the court's refusal to hold the corporation liable in that
case. There, a railroad corporation had guaranteed the credit of certain indi-
viduals in order to enable them to conduct a music festival in the city of
Boston, expecting that this would increase the passenger traffic over its railroad,
which ran to Boston. Here, the beneficiaries of the corporation's guaranty
contract were not those from whom the corporation hoped to receive its benefit;
while the general public, from whom it expected to receive benefit, were neither
in the business of selling railroad tickets nor in any way beneficiaries of the
corporation's bounty.
A different type of case is that in which the purpose of the corporation's
guaranty contract is to increase or preserve the value of assets in which it has
35. Wood Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 Pac. 905 (1920); London & Lan-
cashire Indemnity Co. v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co., 112 Ohio St. 136, 147 N. E. 329
(1925).
36. Simpson v. Bergman, 125 Cal. App. 1, 13 P. (2d) 531 (1932).
37. Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, no Tex. 543, 221 S. W. 930 (1920).
38. James Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 Pac. 415 (1919) ; Parlin &
Orendorff Implement Co. v. Frey, 2oo S. W. 1143 (Tex. Civ. App. I918). But cf. Hayes v.
State, 124 Ohio St. 485, 179 N. E. 402 (193I) where, a judgment creditor being about to levy
in execution on a corporation which was the selling outlet of another corporation's products,
the other corporation tendered itself as surety on a supersedeas bond in order to stay execution.
The court held that the clerk of courts was not bound to accept the bond, distinguishing the
case from all those in which the guaranty contract had been given on the ground that here
the contract was being challenged at its very inception.
39. Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Thixton, 199 Ky. 69, 250 S. W. 504 (1923).
40. Limerick Mills v. Royal Textile Co., 193 N. E. 9 (Mass. 1934). The fact that plain-
tiff was a competitor of the guarantor can be inferred only from the name of the plaintiff.
The brief opinion gives no reason for the decision beyond the "udtra vires" character of the
transaction.
41. 131 Mass. 258 (I881).
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an interest. Thus, where the corporation, owning a building, undertakes the
payment of another's debt, in order to prevent his creditor from filing a material-
man's lien against the building, it is held liable.4 2  So, too, where a holding
corporation guarantees the credit of its subsidiary, the purpose being to preserve
the value of its shares in the subsidiary, it has been held liable.4 3 In deter-
mining here whether or not the transaction could reasonably have been re-
garded as fair, the amount and value of the stock owned by the holding com-
pany, and the amount of the liability assumed should be material factors. Thus,
where it owned all the shares of the subsidiary and gave its bond for $i,ooo in
order to release the subsidiary's delivery truck which had been seized in a
replevin suit, it was held liable. 4 Another factor is the degree of commercial
interdependence between the holding company and the subsidiary. For instance,
where the holding corporation not only owned a majority of the shares of the
subsidiary, but also relied upon it for the marketing of all the products manu-
factured by it, it was held liable.
4 5
Superficially similar to the cases just discussed, yet actually distinguishable,
are those in which a corporation, most or all of whose shares are owned by
some individual, guarantees the credit of another corporation, most of whose
stock is owned by the same individual. The first corporation, owning no stock
in the second, clearly has no interest in the transaction. Its shareholder, how-
ever, being also a shareholder in the second corporation, which has received
the benefit of the transaction, can suffer no real injury, for the benefit to the
second corporation compensates him for the injury to the first. Therefore, so
long as creditors of the first corporation are not adversely affected, it is held
liable.40 Where, however, the first corporation has become insolvent, and the
holder of the guaranty contract attempts to claim against other creditors, a
diff-erent situation is presented. Creditors of a corporation must ordinarily
satisfy their claims out of the assets of the debtor corporation, and may not
look to shareholders' assets. The advantages of the guaranty contract which
inured to the second corporation and, thence, to its shareholders, could there-
fore, in no way benefit the first corporation's creditors, and so here the guaranty
contract is not held binding.
4 7
Where the corporation's interest in the property whose value the guaranty
contract is intended to increase or preserve is less than that of ownership, the
problem is somewhat different. Thus, where a corporation has a lien on land,
and pledged its credit for the purpose of enabling the owner of the land to
construct a building upon it, the increased value of the land cannot benefit the
corporation, unless the value of its lien is nearly equal to that of the land. It
follows, therefore, that in the absence of evidence revealing these values, the
corporation is not held liable.
4 8
Similar in principle to the cases in which property owned by the corpora-
tion was to be benefited, is one in which the corporation, as a result of the
42. Becker Provision Co. v. Parker Hardware Co., 146 Ark. 539, 226 S. W. 177 (192o).
43. Federal Reserve Bank v. Pac. Grain Co., 2 F. (2d) 270 (D. Ore. 1924) ; Henderson
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; American Surety Co.
V. '4 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 176 N. E. 785 (1931) ; State Bank of Fairfax v. Pac.
Elevator Co., 159 Minn. 94, 198 N. W. 304 (1924).
44. American Surety Co. v. 14 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 176 N. E. 785 (193).
Accord: Federal Reserve Bank v. Pac. Grain Co., 2 F. (2d) 270 (D. Ore. 1924).
45. Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). Ac-
cord: Howard v. Tatum, Si W. Va. 561, 94 S. E. 965 (1918).
46. Power County v. Avans Bros. Land Co., 43 Idaho 158, 252 Pac. 182 (1926).
47. First National Bank v. Towner, 239 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
48. Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc. v. Cameron County Lumber Co., 56 S. W. (2d) 256 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
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guaranty contract, is relieved of other liabilities, either matured or unmatured.
Thus, where an employee of the corporation agreed to discontinue a suit for
unpaid wages and to cancel his employment contract, this was held to be suffi-
cient benefit to render its guaranty binding."5 While such a transaction neither
increases nor preserves the value of the corporation's assets, it does increase
the value of its net assets-i. e., the value of its interest in those assets which it
already has.
An interesting situation is presented where a corporation, having mort-
gaged its land as security for an obligation involving no possibilty of benefit to
itself, subsequently sells the land, the amount of the mortgage being deducted
in computing the purchase price, and the mortgagee then sues to foreclose the
mortgage. Assuming that the mortgagee had accepted the mortgage with
knowledge of its accommodation character, so that he could not possibly have
succeeded in a foreclosure action against the corporation, may he now succeed
in his action against the grantee? The one case involving this problem held
that he might,5" and, in view of the fact that the contrary result would have
unjustly enriched the grantee, without in any way curing the injury to the
corporation's shareholders, this result seems to be correct.
The cases thus far discussed reveal that either one of two facts must be
present in order to render a corporation liable on a guaranty contract-either
the plaintiff does not know of the accommodation character of the transaction, or
that some benefit to the corporation was expected to result from it. In only one
case has it been held that the mere fact that the plaintiff had parted with assets
in reliance on the corporation's promise was sufficient to render the guaranty
contract binding.51 Nevertheless, the fact of the plaintiff's change of position is
extremely important. Thus, although it has been held that where a plaintiff had
loaned money to a corporation, relying on its promise to pay the pre-existing debt
of another as part of the consideration for the loan, the promise was binding; 52
yet, where the plaintiff had made no loan himself, having merely induced another
to do so, he was not allowed to recover. 53 It thus appears that, although the
plaintiff's change of position will not enable him to recover in the absence of
expectable benefit to the corporation, yet such change of position is a sine qua
non to his recovery.
C. Effect of Consent of Shareholders
Since all the decisions heretofore discussed have confirmed the theory
that the reason underlying the courts' refusal to enforce accommodation guar-
anty contracts against the corporation is their desire to protect the interests of
shareholders and creditors, the effect of the shareholders' consent would seem
to be obvious. The injury to their interests, having been consented to, should
no longer bar the plaintiff from recovery; but the injury to creditors, not
having been consented to, still remains a bar and should prevent the courts
from enforcing the guaranty contract. In both types of case, the courts have
unanimously reached these results.5
49. In re Prospect Leasing Co., 250 Fed. 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
5o. Aitken v. Stewart, i P. (2d) 988 (Cal. App. 1933).
51. Lohrer v. Vogel Real Estate Co., 239 S. W. 1098 (Mo. App. 1922).
52. Northland Produce Co. v. Stephens, 116 Minn. 23, 133 N. W. 93 (91H).
53. In re Admur Shoe Co., 13 F. (2d) 147 (D. Mass. 1926).
54. Cases holding the corporation liable, all shareholders having consented, and no injury
to creditors' interests being involved: Murphy v. Ark. Land Improvement Co., 97 Fed. 723
(W. D. Ark. 1899); Thomas v. E. G. Curtis Sons Co., 7 F. Supp. 114 (E. D. Mich. 1934);
I-Iuntington Brewing Co. v. McGrew, 64 Ind. App. 273, 112 N. E. 534 (1916); Santos v.
National Bank, 130 Misc. 348, 223 N. Y. Supp. 817 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; National Bank of Com-
merce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259, 218 Pac. 552 (1923).
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Simple as are these general principles, in their application to particular
cases a number of problems have arisen. First, how many shareholders must
have consented in order for a court to hold that the "shareholders" have con-
sented ? The general rule is that the consent of all the shareholders is essential.55
One qualification exists. The consent of persons who are nominal shareholders
for the purpose of complying with statutes requiring a minimum number of
shareholders, or requiring each director to own a minimum number of shares,
is immaterial.5 8
Second, the question arises whether the corporation must be insolvent
before the court will protect the interests of creditors by refusing to enforce
the guaranty. Three cases have refused to allow the plaintiff to recover against
the solvent corporation, despite the fact that all the shareholders had consented
to the transaction.5 7  In another case, however, in which it appeared that the
corporation had assets of $300,000, including a surplus of $2oo,ooo, and hardly
any creditors, the plaintiff was permitted to recover on accommodation bonds
amounting to $165,ooo."8 The conclusion would, therefore, seem to be that
creditors' interests will, in general, prevent a plaintiff from recovering against
even a solvent corporation; but where it affirmatively appears that, even after
the payment of the contract in suit, there would remain far more than enough
assets to pay all existing creditors, then he may recover.
The third question is whether the courts will protect the interests of only
such creditors as were creditors when the guaranty contract was executed, or
those of subsequent creditors, as well. Five cases have expressly held that the
plaintiff might recover where existing creditors were not injured, with dicta to
the effect that subsequent creditors will not be allowed to complain. 5 On the
other hand, five cases have held that the plaintiff might not recover because of
creditors' interests, three not revealing whether existing or subsequent creditors
were involved; '0 one intimating that subsequent creditors should be pro-
tected,"" and the fifth going on the peculiar ground that because creditors had
existed at the time of the execution of the guaranty contract the corporation
lacked "power" to execute such a contract, and the fact that all these creditors
Cases refusing to hold the corporation liable, all shareholders having consented, in order
to prevent an injury to creditors: Pantaze v. Murphy, 54 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ;
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Ben Rose Tire Co., 264 Mich. 268, 249 N. W. 847 (1933) ; Wash-
ington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., ig Wash. i65, 52 Pac. iO67 (1898).
55. Food Products Co. v. Pierce, 154 Va. 74, 152 S. E. 562 (193o) ; see Steiner v. Steiner
Land & Lumber Co., 12o Ala. 128, 142, 26 So. 494, 497 (1898).
56. Murphy v. Ark. Land Improvement Co., 97 Fed. 723 (W. D. Ark. 1899) ; Hunting-
ton Brewing Co. v. McGrew, 64 Ind. App. 273, 112 N. E. 534 (1916); National Bank of
Commerce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259, 218 Pac. 552 (1923).
57. In re McLean Store Fixtures Corp., 4 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mass. 1933) ; Boston Box
Co. v. Shapiro, 249 Mass. 373, 144 N. E. 233 (1924) ; Newton v. Houston Hot Well Improve-
ment Co., 211 S. W. 96o (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). The two latter cases made no mention of
creditors. However, unless these decisions are to be explained on the ground of "lack of
power", it must be assumed that the desire to protect creditors is the undisclosed reason for
the decisions.
58. Mann v. Mann, 57 N. D. 550, 223 N. W. 186 (1929).
59. Pueblo Foundry & Machine Co. v. Lannon, 68 Colo. 131, 187 Pac. io31 (1920) ; Mann
v. Mann, 57 N. D. 550, 223 N. W. 186 (1929) (both actions against the solvent corporation) ;
First National Bank of Gadsden v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898) ; Swift v.
Smith, 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534 (1886) ; Memphis Lumber Co. v. Security Bank & Trust Co.,
143 Tenn. 136, 226 S. W. 182 (1920) (actions against the insolvent corporation).
6o. Pantaze v. Murphy, 54 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; In re McLean Store Fix-
tures Corp., 4 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mass. 1933) ; Sargent v. Palace Cafe Co., 175 Cal. 737, 167
Pac. 146 (1917).
61. Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Ben Rose Tire Co., 264 Mich. 268, 271, 249 N. W. 847,
848 (1933).
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had been paid since then could not enable the plaintiff to recover as against
subsequent creditors. 2
It might seem, at first blush, that subsequent creditors should not be heard
to complain in such cases, because they could have protected themselves by
examining a statement of the corporation's assets and liabilities before extend-
ing credit to it. But, though such reasoning might be valid when applied against
creditors who had never dealt with the corporation prior to the execution of
the accommodation contract, it loses force when applied against those who had
been dealing with it prior to its execution. As a matter of business practice,
corporations do not prepare, and credit men do not inspect, new balance sheets
every day or even every week. It would seem to follow, therefore, that an
accommodation contract should not be valid against creditors of the latter class,
except as to claims acquired after the lapse of a reasonable time in which they
should have learned of its execution.
None of the cases have expressly distinguished between classes of subse-
quent creditors on the basis herein suggested. In those cases, however, in
which the guaranty obligation was secured by a mortgage, it might seem that
such a distinction is unnecessary, in view of the fact that mortgages are usually
recorded and so come to the "constructive" attention of all the world. 3 But
such notice would be insufficient to warn a prospective creditor who, visualizing
the corporation's financial condition as it had been prior to the accommodation
mortgage, would probably assume that, in return for the mortgage, the cor-
poration bad received a commensurate amount of new assets, and so, that its
net assets had not been changed. This consideration has received express
recognition by two federal courts, one case holding that, for this reason, an
accommodation mortgage was not valid as against subsequent creditors."4
A fourth question appears to have been raised by a number of cases in
which the action was against a solvent corporation, and it did not affirmatively
appear whether or not there were any creditors whose interests might be ad-
versely affected. Should the court, in such a case, assume that such creditors
do exist, until the plaintiff has proved that they do not, or should it assume
that none exist, until the corporation has proved that some do? Though most
of the cases have not expressly referred to such a question, their decisions
impliedly give rise to it. Thus, three cases have held the corporation liable,
upon proof of consent of all the shareholders, without expressly mentioning
whether creditors did or did not exist,'; thus apparently acting upon the assump-
tion that none existed, until the contrary should have been proved. On the
other hand, three cases have refused so to hold, one expressly on the ground that
the court should not wait for creditors to intervene before giving consideration
to their interests,6 the other two being silent as to creditors.17  However, unless
62. Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., i9 Wash. i65, 52 Pac. 1o67 (1898).
63. Cases in which the guaranty obligation was secured by a mortgage: First National
Bank of Gadsden v. Winchester, II9 Ala. i68, 24 So. 351 (I898) ; Swift v. Smith, 65 Md.
428, 5 At. 534 (1886) ; Behrman v. Zelman, 130 Misc. 846, 225 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (in which the complaining party was one who had purchased shares in the corporation,
having actual knowledge of the existence of the mortgage).
64. In re Haas Co., 131 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904). In re Lion Furniture Co., 231
Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916) recognized the principle laid down by In re Haas Co., but found
that in the case at bar the record of the mortgage had contained sufficient information to
warn prospective creditors of the fact that it was an accommodation mortgage.
65. Huntington Brewing Co. v. McGrew, 64 Ind. App. 273. 112 N. E. 534 (x916) ; But-
terworth & Lowe v. Kritzer, 115 Mich. 1, 72 N. W. 99o (1897) (in which there was also
expectable benefit to the corporation-though the decision was rested on the fact that all the
shareholders had consented) ; National Bank of Commerce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah
259, 218 Pac. 552 (1923).
66. Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App. 8I8, 79 S. E.
45 (1913).
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these latter two decisions are to be explained on the ground that a corporation
lacks "power" to bind itself to an accommodation contract, it must be assumed
that the courts wished to protect creditors, despite the fact that none had been
proved to exist; and in view of the fact that all but one 08 of the cases heretofore
cited have clearly shown that "lack of power" is never a reason for a decision,
such an assumption becomes inevitable.
Of the two views presented, the better one would seem to be that which
would cast upon the corporation the burden of proving that creditors do exist.
The only danger to which this might lead is that creditors might be "frozen out"
by the corporation's collusive failure to offer the fact of their existence as a
defense. Such a danger, however, is negligible, for if the corporation were
willing to submit to liability, it would have paid the plaintiff voluntarily, and
action at law would never have been commenced. And, in view of the fact that
the books and records by means of which the existence of creditors and the
dates of their various claims would have to be proved are in the control of the
corporation, it is only fair to call upon the corporation to produce them in
evidence.
A fifth question which might be asked is whether the actual consent of
the shareholders is essential in order to induce a court to disregard the possible
injury to their interests. The answer given by the cases is that actual consent
is not always necessary; that if, under all the circumstances of the particular
case, the presently dissenting shareholders had a reasonable opportunity to learn
of and repudiate the unauthorized transaction, they will not now be permitted
to do so. Such a result has been reached where the dissenting shareholder was
also a director with access to the corporation's books from which he might have
learned of the unauthorized transaction, where his wife, who was also a share-
holder, had been present at the meeting at which the transaction had been
authorized, and where the unauthorized transaction was in the form of a mort-
gage, which had been recorded in the Recorder of Deeds' office.6  One case
has held that even such special circumstances need not be shown; that where
the general manager had paid a corporate note executed for his own accom-
modation, and the corporation, after a lapse of two years, sued to recover the
money paid it was barred by its negligence.7 0 The court assumed without dis-
67. Boston Box Co. v. Shapiro, 249 Mass. 373, 144 N. E. 233 (1924) ; Newton v. Houston
Hot Well Improvement Co., 211 S. W. 96o (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). Two other cases appear
to support this view, but may be explained on other grounds. Thus, in Kaplan Dry Goods
Co. v. Sanger Bros., 214 S. W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. ig), cited supra note 25, in which the
corporation, with consent of its sole shareholder, agreed to pool its assets with those of four
other businesses, for the payment of all their debts, it was held not liable to the receiver in
bankruptcy of one of the other four. But here the receiver (i. e., the creditors) could have
sued only as third-party beneficiary, and it seems clear that there had been no intent to make
him more than an incidental beneficiary. In Taylor Feed Pen Co. v. Taylor National Bank,
215 S. W. 85o (Tex. Comm. App. i9ig), the president of a corporation offered to mortgage
his land as security for debts owed by the corporation to a bank. The bank refused to ac-
cept it hecause such mortgage would have been subject to the homestead exemption laws. The
president thereupon formed another corporation, to which the land was conveyed, and which
then mortgaged it to the bank. The court held the mortgage to be of no effect, saying that
"the bank was party to the creation of a corporation for an unauthorized purpose for its own
benefit . . . the company's policy was dictated by the bank" (215 S. W. at 852). The
real reason for the decision seems to have been the court's desire to discourage the use of the
corporation as a device for the evasion of the homestead laws, especially when such evasion
is due to a creditor's insistence.
68. Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., i9 Wash. i65, 52 Pac. 1O67 (1898),
cited supra note 62.
69. Defanti v. Allen Clark Co., 45 Nev. I2O, I98 Pac. 549 (1921). See Morton v. Lovell
Building Co., 43 Wyo. 8I, at 103, 297 Pac. 799, at 807 (93i).
7o. American Bonding Co. v. Laigle Stave & Lumber Co., iii Ark. i5, 163 S. W. 167
(1914).
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cussion that the shareholders were necessarily bound by the negligence of the
directors in failing to learn of the unauthorized payment and to sue for its
rescission. But even if the directors had themselves participated in the pay-
ment it is submitted that the shareholders should be permitted to rescind the
transaction. An explanation of this decision may lie in the distinction between
a suit to recover money improperly paid and a defense to an action brought to
compel an allegedly improper payment.
A particularly striking demonstration of the fact that the decisions in the
field of law herein discussed are determined by a consideration of the interests
of human persons interested in the corporation, as distinguished from the cor-
porate "person" itself, is offered by the following two cases. It has been seen
that, as a general rule, where all the shareholders have consented to an accom-
modation transaction, and there is no danger of injury to the interests of cred-
itors, the obligation will be enforced. Suppose, however, that the sole share-
holder of the corporation whose credit is gratuitously pledged is itself a cor-
poration, whose directors have consented to the transaction, but whose
shareholders have not. Has the "sole shareholder" consented? In view of
the fact that the loss arising out of the accommodation transaction must in-
evitably fall upon the human shareholders of the holding corporation, who have
not consented, the inevitable conclusion is that the transaction should not be
upheld, and this result was reached in the one case in which the problem was
raised."' Suppose, however, that the accommodation guaranty given by the
subsidiary corporation was for the benefit of the holding corporation itself.
Here, although the human shareholders of the holding corporation have not
consented, they suffer no injury, because any loss arising out of the loss to the
subsidiary corporation is compensated for by the fact that the benefit to the
holding corporation inures to these very shareholders. Here it would seem
that the transaction should be upheld, and such was the result reached in the one
case in which these facts appeared."
II. Transactions Purporting to Create Corporate Indebtedness in Excess of
Some Stated Limitation Thereon.
The most notable difference between the cases thus far discussed and those
now to be discussed is that, in the former group, it was the exception, rather
than the rule, that the corporation should have received any benefit from the
transaction, whereas, in the present group, the exceptional case is the one in
which the corporation has failed to receive some benefit. The typical case is
one in which the corporation has received money or other assets in return for
an obligation which it has incurred, the sole defect being that the obligation
thus incurred happens to be in excess of the maximum amount of indebtedness
permitted by statute or the articles of association or both. It is true, of course,
that to exceed such a limitation might cause an injury to shareholders and
creditors. Such injury would result if the earning power of the corporation
should not increase in proportion to the increase in the amount of capital em-
ployed by it, with the result that interest on debts might cut into profits, or even
capital, thus weakening the financial structure of the corporation. Such an
injury, however, is very different from the direct and obvious gap in the cor-
poration's assets which is created when a corporation is compelled to pay a
gratuitous guaranty obligation, and the decisions reflect this difference strikingly.
7i. Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App. 8x8, 79 S. E.
45 (1913).
72. Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc. 417, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1929). The
court stated "In the instant case there was more than ratification, for the bonds were pledged
by the sole stockholder for its own benefit." Id. at 434, 236 N. Y. Supp. at 59.
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Where the plaintiff extends credit to the corporation without actual knowl-
edge of the fact that the debt thus created exceeds the authorized maximum,
this difference is not significant, for just as such a plaintiff was permitted to
recover on a guaranty contract, so do all courts here permit him to recover,"'
even where he claims against other creditors. 74  And where, shortly after the
creation of the debt in suit, the excess is eliminated by properly increasing the
authorized maximum, it is an a fortiori proposition that such debt will be binding
on the corporation.
7 5
But where the plaintiff knew that the debt would be in excess of the
authorized maximum, the difference at once becomes obvious. Though in the
guaranty cases the plaintiff with knowledge was ordinarily barred from re-
covery, here all courts permit him to recover against the solvent corporation. 6
Where the plaintiff claims against creditors, the corporation being insolvent,
two cases have allowed recovery, at least against creditors who had become
such subsequent to the creation of the debt in suit.7 7  Kentucky has held that
where he claims against depositors of a banking corporation, he cannot recover,
even though they be subsequent depositors, and even though he had no actual
knowledge of the excess, the court charging him with knowledge of the pro-
visions of the statutes and articles of association. 78  Apart from banking cor-
porations, most courts would probably hold that the plaintiff may recover even
against creditors, existing or subsequent, for the reason that here, unlike the
guaranty cases, the plaintiff has augmented the assets of the corporation, which
increase has inured to the benefit of creditors fully as much as to that of share-
holders.
In connection with the possibility of charging a plaintiff with knowledge
that a corporation has exceeded its limit of indebtedness, it must be realized
that acquaintance with the statutory and charter provisions may not always
inform him whether or not such limit has been exceeded. Thus, where the
limitation is stated to be the "amount of paid in capital stock", the amount of
the limitation cannot be known without having also ascertained the amount of
capital stock which has been paid for. No court has required a prospective
creditor to examine the corporation's books in order to acquire this informa-
tion.79 Moreover, even where the limitation is stated in terms of dollars, or is
73. Equitable Trust Co. v. Washington-Idaho Co., 3oo Fed. 6ol (E. D. Wash. 1924);
Gibson v. Kansas City Refining Co., 32 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; Douglass v. State
Bank of Orlando, 77 Fla. 83o, 82 So. 593 (1919) ; Junkin v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., I8
Iowa 1203, 165 N. W. 339 (1917); Auerbach v. Le Sueur Mill Co., 28 Minn. 291, 9 N. W.
799 (1881); Vandemark v. Actuating Farm Gate Co., 26 Ohio App. 29o, 159 N. E. 852
(1926); Union Trust Co. v. Mercantile Library Hall Co., 189 Pa. 263, 42 Atl. 129 (1899).
But cf. Elliott National Bank v. Western & Atl. R. R., 2 Lea 676 (Tenn. 1879) where the
defendant corporation had been acting as, and was being sued as, an "arm" of the state of
Georgia.
74. Central Trust Co. v. Columbus Ry., 87 Fed. 8,5 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1898).
75 Blair v. Metropolitan Bank, 27 Wash. 192, 67 Pac. 609 (19o2) ; cf. Brown v. Dillard,
15 F. (2d) 4o8 (N. D. Tex. 1926).
76. Humphrey v. Patrons' Mercantile Association, 50 Iowa 6o7 (1879); Simmons v.
Farmers' Union Co-op., 114 Neb. 463, 208 N. W. 144 (1926).
77. Beach v. Wakefield, 1O7 Iowa 567, 76 N. W. 688 (1898) ; Matin v. Calmenson, I58
Minn. 282, 197 N. W. 262 (1924).
78. Bell v. Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works, 2o Ky. L. Rep. 1089, 48 S. W. 44o
(i898) ; American Southern National Bank v. Smith, 17o Ky. 512, 186 S. W. 482 (1916).
79. Conn. River Savings Bank v. Fiske, 6o N. H. 363 (188o). So, too, where the limita-
tion is based on the physical valuation of the corporation's assets. Equitable Trust Co. v.
W, ashington-Idaho Co., 30o Fed. 6oi (E. D. Wash. 1924).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
said to be "the total authorized capital stock",8 ° the prospective creditor cannot
know whether of not this limitation has been or will be exceeded without also
knowing the amount of indebtedness which the corporation has already incurred,
unless the amount of credit which he himself proposes to extend to the cor-
poration would alone exceed this limitation. In both Kentucky cases cited
supra 81 in which the plaintiff had been barred from recovery as against bank
depositors on the theory of imputed knowledge of the excess, his debt alone
exceeded the authorized maximum; but in another Kentucky case, involving
exactly the same facts, except that here the plaintiff's debt did not alone exceed
the maximum amount, the court distinguished it on this very ground, and held
that the plaintiff might share pro rata with other creditors.
8 2
That the element of benefit to the corporation is, perhaps, the most im-
portant single factor in this field of law is revealed by the courts' reaction to
cases in which the corporation, having incurred a debt in excess of the author-
ized maximum, had not received any increase in its assets as a result of the
transaction. In First National Bank v. Kiefer Milling Co. the plaintiff had
loaned $77,000 to a corporation, the limit of whose indebtedness was $3o,ooo.
The treasurer, to whom the money was paid, absconded, causing the corporation
to become insolvent. The plaintiff was allowed to share ratably with other
creditors only to the extent of $3o,ooo.3 The court conceded the treasurer's
authority to borrow on behalf of the corporation, and that the plaintiff had no
knowledge, either of the treasurer's intent to abscond, or of the fact that the
limitation on indebtedness had been exceeded, but said that he was charged
with knowledge that this limitation had been exceeded, and stressed the fact
that this was an attempt to claim against other creditors. However, it is almost
impossible to read the opinion without feeling that if the $77,ooo had been used
for corporate purposes, the decision would have been different-despite the fact
that there is no logical connection between the exceeding of the limitation on
indebtedness and the treasurer's absconding with the money.
Another situation in which the corporate assets are not increased as a result
of the transaction is where it issues bonds, secured by mortgage, as security for
its pre-existing debts. In Hess Warming & Ventilating Co. v. Burlington Grain
Elevator Co.,"4 in which the recipients of the bonds had known that the debt
limitation was being exceeded, the mortgage was held unenforceable against one
who had been a creditor at the time of its execution, but in Marin v. Calmensong"
there is a dictum which is squarely contra. It is interesting to note that in this
situation there is no ultimate increase in the corporation's total indebtedness.
for the creditor may enforce either the old debt or the bonds given to secure it,
but not both. The real question, therefore, is whether the preferential character
of the new debts should be defeated merely because, at the time of their crea-
tion, the corporation's indebtedness had already exceeded the authorized maxi-
mum. Here, again, there seems to be no logical connection between the ir-
regularity in the transaction and the consequence which the court has caused to
8o. Gibson v. Kansas City Refining Co., 32 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 8th 1929) ; Simmon--
v. Farmers' Union Co-op., 114 Neb. 463, 208 N. W. 144 (1926) (limitation based on author-
ized capital stock) ; Douglass v. State Bank of Orlando, 77 Fla. 830, 82 So. 593 (919) ;
Auerbach v. Le Sueur Mill Co., 28 Minn. 291, 9 N. W. 799 (1881) (limitation expressed in
terms of a certain number of dollars).
Si. Bell v. Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works, 2o Ky. L. Rep. 1O89, 48 S. W. 440
(1898) ; American Southern National Bank v. Smith, 17o Ky. 512, 186 S. W. 482 (1916).
both cited supra note 78.
82. Citizens' Bank v. Bank of Waddy, 126 Ky. 169, 103 S. W. 249 (1907).
83. First National Bank v. Kiefer Milling Co., 95 Ky, 97, 23 S. W. 675 (1893).
84. 280 Mo. 163, 217 S. W. 493 (91).
85. 58 Minn. 282, 197 N. W. 262 (1924).
NOTES
flow from it. In both. First National Bank v. Kiefer Milling Co., and Hess
Warming & Ventilating Co. v. Burlington Grain Elevator Co., the courts have
used the limitations upon corporate indebtedness as a method of reaching results
for other reasons deemed desirable. The reasons seem to be the injury to the
corporation, in the first case, and the injury to creditors arising from the crea-
tion of a preference, in the second. In both cases, though the absence of
benefit to the corporation may not justify the decisions, it does serve to explain
them.
An interesting distinction as to what constitutes "benefit" to a corporation
has been made by the English courts. Contrary to the prevailing American
view, they have held that where a corporation borrows money, creating in-
debtedness in excess of the stated limitation, the contract is unenforceable by
the lender."8 But where the borrowed money was used to pay pre-existing
debts of the corporation, an exception has been made on the theory that since
the lender's money was used to pay the pre-existing debts, he might "step into
the shoes" of those creditors who had been paid, and thus acquire the status
of a creditor of the corporation. 7 This doctrine of subrogation has been
applied even where the lender had known of the irregular character of the
loan," and even where the debts paid off had not been incurred until after the
making of the loan itself.8 9 In the United States, where such contracts have
been upheld, irrespective of the purpose for which the proceeds have been used,
this doctrine obviously has no significance.' 0
III. Transactions Wherein a Corporation Borrows Money, Intending to Use It
for Some Ultra Vires Purpose.
The cases now to be considered differ from those heretofore discussed in
that it is here possible to say, as most courts have, that the borrowing transac-
tion itself is not unauthorized or improper, but that only the use to which the
corporation's officers subsequently put the proceeds is unauthorized; and that,
inasmuch as the lender cannot control the subsequent conduct of the directors,
he may always recover from the corporation, provided only that he had not
made it a condition of the loan that the proceeds be used for the unauthorized
purpose." However, it is equally possible to say that the authority of a cor-
poration's directors to borrow money is limited to borrowings for certain pur-
poses, and so, if they borrow for an unauthorized purpose, the act of borrowing
is itself unauthorized, thus making the lender a party to an ultra vires transac-
tion. The pertinent inquiry, therefore, is whether the language of the courts
really explains their decisions, or whether these decisions, too, are governed by
the principles which have been found to underlie those in the preceding sections.
In those cases in which the lender had no knowledge of the directors'
intent to use the proceeds of the loan for an unauthorized purpose, no answer
to this inquiry can be found, for here all courts have allowed the plaintiff to
recover the amount of the loan, both where the proceeds had been used for the
86. See In re Cork & Youghal Ry., L. R. 4 Ch. App. 747 (1869).
87. In re Cork & Youghal Ry., L. R. 4 Ch. App. 747 (1869).
88. Reversion Fund & Ins. Co. v. Maison Conway, [1913] i. K. B. 364.
89. Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co., L. R. i Q. B. D. 155 (1887).
go. Except for one old case, in which the court allowed the lender to recover on the
ground that, since the borrowed money had been used to pay other debts of the corporation;
there had not been any ultimate increase in its indebtedness, and so the purpose of the limita-
tion was not defeated. Richards v. Merrimack & Conn. R. R., 44 N. H. 127 (1862).
91. See Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 330, 21 N. E. 9o7, 9o9 (1889) ; Marion Trust
Co. v. Crescent Loan & Investment Co., 27 Ind. App. 451, 457, 61 N. E. 688, 69o (1goi).
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benefit of the borrowing corporation, 9 2 and where they had been used for the
benefit of some other person 93 or corporation.9 4 These results coincide with
those reached in the guaranty and debt limitation cases.
Where, however, the lender knew of the directors' intent, the problem
becomes more interesting. So long as their intent was to use the proceeds for
the benefit of the borrowing corporation, all courts have allowed the lender to
recover. Thus, recovery has been allowed where the directors' purpose was to
carry on the corporate business in another state, in violation of the articles of
association; "' where the purpose was to make a loan to another corporation; 01
and where it was to pay off outstanding life insurance policies, so as to enable
the borrowing corporation to change over from a life insurance to an accident
insurance business, which it was not authorized to do.9" But where, to the
knowledge of the lender, the intent was to use the money for the benefit of a
person other than the borrowing corporation, he was barred from recovery.
Thus, where the directors intended to use the proceeds to purchase stock for the
president of the corporation; 's or where the officer representing the corporation
in the transaction intended to use the proceeds for his own purposes, the lender
was denied recovery. 99 While the latter transaction is not ordinarily dubbed
ultra vires, because the directors did not participate, the case is not dis-
tinguishable in principle from one in which the board of directors borrow, in-
tending to use the proceeds for their own purposes, or for the benefit of some
other individual. In the one case, an individual officer has borrowed for his
own purposes, without the consent of his superiors, the directors; in the other,
a group of officers, the directors, have borrowed for their purposes, without the
consent of their superiors, the shareholders and creditors.
Thus, the factors of benefit to the corporation and knowledge of the
lender again stand out as the most significant ones, and it becomes clear that
the theory voiced by the courts to the effect that a loan made for an ultra vires
purpose is not itself ultra vires because the lender is unable to control the
ultimate disposition of the proceeds, is not the real reason for the decisions, but
is merely another elaborate method of describing results already reached for
other reasons. Other cases bring this out with equal clarity. If this theory were
the real reason for the decisions, then where the lender pays the amount of the
loan, on the corporation's behalf, directly to the person with whom the corpora-
tion has made its ultra vires contract, knowing for what purpose this payment
is being made, it would be expected that he should certainly be barred from
recovery, for in such a case it could not be said that he was unable to control the
ultimate disposition of the proceeds of the loan. But even here the element of
benefit to the corporation plays an important r6le. For where the corporation
did get the benefit of the proceeds, only one case barred the plaintiff from re-
covery, 10 while one federal case held squarely contra on the ground that the
92. Union Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 251 Pa. I, 95 Atl. 855 (1915) ; see Alley
v. Butte & Western Mining Co., 77 Mont. 477, 496, 251 Pac. 517, 524 (1926).
93. Hillcrest Land Co. v. Fosher, 189 Ala. 217, 66 So. 478 (1914) ; Provident Stores Re-
ceiver v. Tanner, 226 Ky. 364, io S. W. (2d) 1077 (1928) ; Kraft v. Freeman Printing &
Publication Ass'n, 87 N. Y. 628 (1881).
94. Ill. Trust & Savings Bank v. Pac. Ry., 117 Cal. 332, 49 Pac. 197 (1897).
95. Grand Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Zumbrnn, 272 Fed. 943 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921);
Bradley v. Ballard, 55 III. 413 (870).
96. Peoria Life Ins. Co. v. International Life, etc., Co., 246 Ill. App. 38 (927).
97. Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 21 N. E. 9o7 (1889).
98. Schloss Bros. & Co. v. Monongahela National Bank, 6o F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 3d,
1932).
99. Gross Iron Ore Co. v. Paulle, 132 Minn. 16o, 156 N. W. 268 (1916).
ioo. Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Institution for Savings, 68 Me. 43 (1877).
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corporation had received the benefit of the money borrowed.' 0' In one other
case in which the lender was barred from recovery, the proceeds had been used
for speculation in cotton, which had turned out disastrously, so that, although
the corporation got the benefit of the money in the sense that it had had an
opportunity to speculate with it, it did not get the benefit, in the sense that no
trace of it could be found among the corporation's assets at the time of suit.
10 2
This decision seems to rest upon three factors: (i) knowledge of the lender,
(2) the fact that the lender made payments directly to the cotton vendors on
behalf of the corporation, and (3) the fact that the speculation had turned out
unsuccessfully.
Another case which reveals the fallacy of the view that a loan for an ultra
vires purpose is not itself ultra vires, is one in which the corporation has con-
tracted to borrow from a lender for an ultra vires purpose, but he subsequently
refuses to make the loan, and the corporation sues to compel him to perform
the contract. If such a contract were not ultra vires, its purpose alone being so
tainted, then it should be enforceable, despite the fact that it is only executory.
Yet, in the one case in which this situation was presented, the court held that
the corporation could not recover.1
0 3
Constant use has been made of the phrase, "benefit to the corporation".
So long as the borrowing transaction resulted in an increase in the corporation's
assets, thus benefiting both shareholders and creditors, the use of this phrase
can cause no confusion. Where, however, the transaction benefits the share-
holders, but not the creditors, the phrase "benefit to the corporation" must be
discarded, and more careful analysis is essential. So, where a corporation,
having no surplus, borrows money for the purpose of buying its own shares,
which it subsequently does, those shareholders whose shares are purchased
obviously benefit since their invested capital is returned to them. But creditors
are distinctly injured. The injury consists in the fact that, although the transac-
tion has in no wise diminished the assets available for distribution, it has placed
a lender, who will claim as a creditor on a parity with other creditors, in the
position formerly occupied by shareholders, as to whom creditors' claims would
have been preferred. To prevent such injury, the logical result would seem to
be to bar the lender from participating in the corporate assets until all other
creditors have been paid, and in both cases in which this problem arose, the
lender having known of the purpose for which the money was to be used, this
result was reached. 0 4
In another case, in which the proceeds were used for the benefit of a few
shareholders, to the injury of the other shareholders as well as that of creditors,
a contrary result was reached. 5 Here, the proceeds of the loan were used to
pay off certain shareholders in full at a time when the corporation's assets could
not have paid off all the shareholders and creditors, again the lender having
known the directors' purpose. The court apparently felt that it must choose
between a full recovery or none at all, and because "the corporation" had bene-
fited to the extent that the shareholders who were paid off would have been
entitled to something on dissolution, it permitted recovery on the loan. The
ideal solution would have been to permit the lender to recover as shareholder.
ioi. Jenson v. Toltec Ranch Co., 174 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o9).
Io0. Planters' Cotton Oil Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, i88 S. W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App.
x916).
IO3. Trenton Mutual Life & Ins. Co. v. McKelway, 12 N. J. Eq. 133 (1858).
104. Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics Bank, io2 Md. 6o8, 63 Atl. 70 (9o6);
Adams & Westlake Co. v. Deyette, 8 S. D. ii9, 65 N. W. 47, (1895).
ioS. Marion Trust Co. v. Crescent Loan & Investment Co., 27 Ind. App. 451, 61 N. E.
688 (I901).
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Such a decision would limit his recovery to exactly the amount of benefit ac-
tually received by those shareholders who were not paid off.
A recent Massachusetts case," 6 on the other hand, has gone to the opposite
extreme in denhying the lender recovery. Here, the proceeds of the loan had
been used to pay a liquidating dividend to the shareholders of the borrowing
corporation, a bank, which dividend had been approved by the shareholders, the
lender having known the borrower's purpose. As part of the same transaction,
the lender, itself a bank, had agreed to assume the payment of all the deposits
of the borrowing bank. In view of the fact that the dividend was paid to all
the shareholders equally, and that the lender had agreed to pay the depositors,
it is difficult to see who might have been injured by a decision permitting the
plaintiff to recover. The only possible ground on which the decision is sus-
tainable is that the borrowing bank had unpaid creditors, other than the de-
positors, whose interests the court wished to protect.
Where, in the type of case now being considered, the lender's action is
brought against the solvent corporation, and creditors' interests are not in-
volved, the lender should ordinarily recover, unless, of course, the proceeds of
the loan were not fairly distributed among the shareholders. In one case, how-
ever, in which the loan was part of a scheme to fleece the public, in which scheme
the lender was an active participant, it was held that he might not recover.'0 7
Here the money had been borrowed in order to enable the directors to issue
dividends at a time when the corporation had no surplus, the purpose being to
inflate the market value of the stock, and thus enable the directors (as well as
the lender, who was also a heavy sharehoider) to dispose of their shares at a
huge profit, and leave the public "holding the bag". Stressing the tacts that
the lender had been one of the incorporators, a director, and a heavy speculator
in its stock, the court decided that, inasmuch as he stood to profit heavily, he
ought to bear the loss of the amount of the loan. The force of such a decision
as precedent is, of course, limited to the peculiar factual situation therein in-
volved.
Statutes
A few states have recently enacted statutes which are designed to abolish
the confusion which is supposed to exist in the ultra zires field. Some provide
that, in actions at law or in equity, between a corporation and a third person,
neither party should be permitted to raise the defense of ultra vires.'0 8 Others,
however, contain an exception to the effect that such a defense may be raised
by or on behalf of the corporation against persons having actual knowledge of
the ultra vires character of the transaction. 0 1 In the light of all the cabes
hitherto discussed, it is apparent that statutes of the latter type simply codify
the common law, for these cases show that the courts have uniformly allowed
a plaintiff without knowledge to recover. But it is doubtful if even the broader
type of statutes will radicaily change the common law. In an extreme case, in
which a plaintiff with knowledge seeks to enforce a contract involving little or
no possibility of benefit to the corporation, the courts are almost certain to take
advantage of the slightest loophole in the statute in order to bar him from
recovery; and, after all, it is in only this type of case that they have, in the
io6. National Shawmut Bank v. Citizens' National Bank, 191 N. E. 647 (Mass. 1934).
107. Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co., 2 Utah 74 (1879).
1o. CAL. CiV. CooE (Deering. 1931) §345; PA. STAT. A--N. (Purdon, Supp. 1934)
§2852; VT. GEN. Lxws (1917) § 4923.
1o). MIcn. Co.,ip. LAWS (Supp. 1934) § 10135-11; CODE oF O11o (Throckmorton, 1930)
§ 8623-8.
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absence of statute, reached this result. That this will be the judicial attitude is
strongly suggested by one case which has arisen under one of the new statutes. 1" 0
A corporation, acting as trustee, signed a contract to purchase land without
indicating its representative capacity. in an -tion to hold the corporation
personally liable, its defense was that it was ultra vires for it to purchase land
on its own account. The court invoked the new statute in holding it liable, but
felt it necessary to bolster its decision by pointing out that ultra ires had not
been pleaded as a defense; that ultra vires should not be a defense "when it will
not advance justice but only where an imperative rule of public policy requires
it"; and that the defendant would not suffer because it had immediate recourse
against the cestuis que trustent. Indeed, the lower court had already given the
corporation judgment against the latter. This entire discussion, which, in the
light of the statute, should have been unnecessary, seems to indicate that in a
proper case, in which the "interests of justice and public policy" would require
a different decision, and in which the defendant would not be so well protected
from ultimate loss, the court might find a way to escape the effect of the statute.
Conclusion
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from the cases herein discussed is
that the courts, with almost perfect unanimity, have consistently applied certain
fundamental principles in reaching their results. All but one agree that in deciding
whether or not an allegedly ultra vires contract should be enforced, the result
should be determined by a consideration of the interests of human persons in-
volved, and that the corporation, as an entity distinct from those persons, has
neither actual nor legal existence. This does not mean that decisions have not
been rendered which can be conveniently described by the statement that "the
court has refused to set aside the corporate entity", for, on the contrary, many
of the decisions hitherto cited can be so described. An obvious example is the
case in which the courts, out of regard for the interests of creditors, have refused
to enforce a purely gratuitous obligation, despite the consent of all its share-
holders. But the reason for such a decision is that to enforce the contract would
be to deplete the aggregate of assets to which creditors must look for the satisfac-
tion of their claims; and it is only by setting aside the corporate entity, that the
courts realize that it should not be set aside.
Further, the cases reveal that when a contract is said to be ultra vires, this
does not mean that it is inherently defective, but is merely another way of describ-
ing the fact that, after a consideration of the various interests which its enforce-
ment or non-enforcement might affect, the court has decided not to enforce it.
The supposedly two-fold question of "when is a contract ultra vires?" and "when
will an ultra vires contract be enforced?" resolves itself into the single question,
"when will the courts, out of regard for the interests of shareholders or creditors
or both, refuse to enforce a contract ?" The following generalizations are sub-
mitted as a statement of the answer to this question which the courts have evolved,
in the field of law herein discussed.
(I) Where there has been no change of position on the part of a plaintiff
in reliance on the contract, so that a failure to enforce it would cause him no
injury, but might, at the most, deny him a profit, the possibility of an injury to
shareholders and creditors, even though it be so indirect and remote as that
which exceeding a stated limitation on indebtedness may cause, will preclude
him from recovery.
(2) But where the plaintiff has changed his position, the mere possibility
of such an injury will not bar him from recovery, whether or not he knew. at
the time of the contract, that such possibility of injury existed.
io. Wardowski v. Guardian Trust Go., 262 Mich. 422, 247 N. W. go (1933).
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(3) Where there is a possibility of injury such as may result from a
gratuitous pledge of the corporation's credit, but where there is also a reasonable
possibility of benefit proportionate to such injury, he may recover, irrespective
of his knowledge at the time of the contract.
(4) But where the possibility of injury such as that described in (3) is not
balanced by any proportionate benefit or possibility thereof, only the plaintiff
who had no knowledge at the time of the contract may recover.
(5) Where the facts are the same as in (4), but all the shareholders have
consented, again the plaintiff may recover, irrespective of knowledge. But
where there is what the court will regard as an unreasonable possibility of
injury to creditors, the shareholders' consent becomes immaterial.
(6) And so, too, where there is no possibility of injury to shareholders,
though an unreasonable possibility of injury to creditors does exist, the plaintiff
will be barred from recovery, but only until the claims of those creditors whose
interests are thus affected have been satisfied.
A.I.C.
A DECADE OF Gianni v. Russell-THE MODERN PENNSYLVANIA PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE-"The principles there announced [in Gianni V. Russell & Co.,]
cut away the dead timber from the Parol Evidence Rule as reflected in our
earlier cases. The rule started with a new aspect-a definite respect for written
instruments." 2 It is not easy to demonstrate the correctness of this recent state-
ment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-the development of rules respecting
the admissibility or inadmissibility of "parol" 3 promises or agreements, made
contemporaneously with the execution of written instruments, for the purpose of
altering, varying, adding to or contradicting written instruments, has been a
disheartening one for both bench and bar. A categorical statement that the law
has changed cannot be made, for two reasons: (I) the disproportionately long
period of time during which the old law was in force as compared with a decade
of recent decisions; (2) the fact that no recent case has definitely stated that
the earlier cases have been overruled. Were it not necessary briefly to recapit-
ulate the decisions prior to Gianni v. Russell in order to show the full import
of the recent cases, this procedure would not be followed, for the development
of the early law is amply shown in two excellent articles previously appearing
in this REVIEW. Mr. Stanley Folz has analyzed the decisions prior to 19o4, 4
and Mr. Earl G. Harrison has traced the law from 1904 until 1925.' Empha-
sis herein will, for those reasons, be chiefly placed upon the Supreme and Supe-
rior Court decisions from 1924 until the present time.
It was at one time stated that: "The English rule that parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary the terms of a written instrument does not exist in this
i. 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).
2. Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, 70, 154 At. 127, 128 (1931).
3. "Parol" as used in "parol evidence rule" in this note, and in the cases cited, generally
refers to oral testimony since it is generally evidence of this nature which is offered to at-
tack the written instrument. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that "the word
parol is used to distinguish contracts which are made verbally, or in writing not under seal,
from those which are under seal". Kime v. Tobyhanna Creek Ice Co., 240 Pa. 6I, 87 Atl.
278 (1913) (italics the writer's).
4. Folz, The Admissibility of Evidence to Establish Oral Contemporaneous Inducing
Promises to Affect Written Instruments in Pennsylvania (19o4) 43 Aii. L. REG. (N. s.) 6oi.
5. Harrison, Pennsylvania Rule as to Admissibility of Evidence to Establish Conten-
poraneous Inducing Promises to Affect Written Instruments (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv.
235. Mr. Folz and Mr. Harrison have kindly consented to the use of much of their material
in the historical summary of this note.
NOTES
state." " This was qualified in a later opinion to the effect that "It would per-
haps be more accurate to say that the rule has been relaxed . . . ".7 The evi-
dence sought to be introduced was generally that of an oral agreement or prom-
ise, made contemporaneously with, and as an inducement to, the written instru-
ment in question. Regarding this class of evidence two lines of decisions devel-
oped: the broader line-that all oral contemporaneous inducing promises were
admissible-has been traced to the unreported case of Hurst's Lessee v. Kirk-
bride." The narrower line, which was really the forerunner of the broader line,
is to the effect that parol evidence is admissible where there has been an attempt
to make a fraudulent use of the instrument in violation of a promise or agree-
ment made contemporaneously with the execution of the writing and without
which it would not have been signed, which promise or agreement stated the use
to which the writing would be put or the purpose for which it was executed.
This line of decisions is said to have started with the case of Thomson v. White.'
The broader rule-commonly referred to as the "Pennsylvania exception" was
fully developed by 182o.10 For the next sixty years, Martin v. Berens " was
the only case which questioned the validity of this broader rule. Both rules
were predicated upon a loose conception of fraud. While all courts will admit
oral evidence to show that a material misrepresentation has been made with
respect to prior or existing facts 12 at the time a written agreement was entered
into, Pennsylvania courts conceived of fraud as applying to future promises
as well. Nor was it necessary to prove that a "fraudulent" intent existed in
limine: "It is as much a fraud to obtain a paper for one purpose, and use it for
a different and unfair purpose, as to practise falsehood or deceit in its procure-
ment." 13 The same conception of fraud was applied to sustain the broader rule
that all contemporaneous inducing promises were admissible. 4 Oral testimony
was so freely admitted that it appeared to Professor Wigmore that the fraud
consisted mainly in an attempt to enforce the instrument as it was written. 5
In 1882, beginning with Thorne v. Warfflein,'0 the broader rule began to
break down. Although oral inducing promises were still admitted if fraud was
properly alleged in the pleadings, the Supreme Court began to reverse cases
which admitted such evidence because the evidence either in quantity, quality,
or character failed to establish the inducing agreement "clearly, precisely, and
indubitably"." And statements began to appear that the violation of an oral
contemporaneous agreement or promise to do something in the future is not
fraud within the meaning of the phrase "fraud, accident, or mistake"., By
1904, therefore, it appeared, as Mr. Folz has pointed out, that the rule admitting
all contemporaneous inducing agreements was extinct, and that such testimony
6. Kostenbader v. Peters, 8o Pa. 438, 441 (1876).
7. Phillips v. Meily, io6 Pa. 536, 543 (1884).
8. Reported in Wallace v. Baker, I Binn. 61o, at 616 (Pa. i8og).
9. I Dall. 424 (Pa. 1789). For the historical development generally of the "parot evi-
dence rule", see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2426.
io. With the decision of Campbell v. M'Clenachan, 6 S. & R. 171 (Pa. 1820).
iI. 67 Pa. 459 (1871).
12. 5 WIG MORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2439.
13. Rearich v. Swinehart, ii Pa. 233, 240 (1849).
14. Powelton Coal Co. v. McShain, 75 Pa. 238 (1874).
15. 5 WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2431 (c).
16. IOO Pa. 519 (1882).
17. Thompson v. Schoch, 254 Pa. 585, 99 Atl. 72 (1916) ; Miller v. Wise, 33 Pa. Super.
589 (1907). The evidence was inadmissible if merely the uncorroborated testimony of a
party in interest. Dixon v. Minogue, 276 Pa. 562, 12o Atl. 664 (1923).
18. Irvin v. Irvin, 142 Pa. 271, 21 AtI. 816 (1891) ; Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503,
2,1 Atl. 73 (1892) ; Dixon-Woods Co. v. Phillips Glass Co., 169 Pa. 167, 32 AtI. 432 (1895) ;
Union Storage Co. v. Speck, 194 Pa. 126, 45 At. 48 (1899) ; Krueger v. Nicola, 205 Pa. 38,
54 Ati. 494 (1903) ; Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. IOI, 56 At. 333 (1903).
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was admissible only if it related to the use to which the writing would be put.
But although the courts had come to a realization that the loose conception of
fraud upon which the broader rule was based was erroneous, later cases never-
theless continued to apply the rule on the basis of stare decisis.19 And. as late
as 19o8, Gandy v. Weckerly 20 stated that a breach of an oral promise was
fraud.
The most distressing feature of the later cases was that indistinguishable
distinctions were drawn between cases at bar and those which had been previ-
ously decided. Parallel decisions involving identical facts reached contrary
results. A panorama 21 of the decisions up to 1924 disclosed this state of the
law:
(i) The evidence was admitted where the oral agreement concerned the
use to which the written instrument might be put, since to allow one of the par-
ties to use the writing in a way that would violate the oral promise which induced
its execution would be a fraud upon the other party.
2
(2) The evidence was admitted for the reason that Pennsylvania had always
recognized as exceptions to the strict parol evidence rule all cases in which the
execution of the writing was induced by a contemporaneous, verbal understand-
ing or agreement, and has permitted such agreements to be introduced in evi-
dence."
(3) Evidence of the contemporaneous, oral, inducing promise or agreement
was admitted only if the promise or agreement was established by evidence that
was clear, precise and indubitable.
24
(4) The parol agreement was admitted since not specifically covered by
the contract, (although concerned with the same subject-matter as that involved
in the writing) and since the oral evidence was not "inconsistent" with the
writing.22
(5) The testimony was admitted because it appeared (a) that the oral
agreement was intended to be included in the writing, but was inadvertently
omitted therefrom,2" or (b) that it was purposely omitted by both parties and
one is now attempting to act in a manner which would constitute a breach of it.
2 7
(6) Evidence of the alleged contemporaneous, inducing promise was inad-
inissible because (a) it would have the effect of nullifying the writing,2s or (b)
it contradicted an express provision of the written instrument,2 ' or (c) it was
19. Croyle v. Cambria Land & Imp. Co., 233 Pa. 3io, 82 Atl. 360 (1912) ; Potter v.
Grimm, 248 Pa. 440, 94 Atl. 185 (i915) [relying on Hurst's Lessee v. Kirkbride, I Binn. 61o,
6i6 (i8o9)]; Humbert v. Myers, 279 Pa. 171, 123 At. 733 (1924) ; Yinger v. Youngman,
30 Pa. Super. 139 (i9o6) (specifically repudiating counsel's argument that current Supreme
Court decisions overturned the old law).
20. 220 Pa. 285, 69 Atl. 858 (I908).
21. The following summary is taken almost verbatim from Mr. Harrison's article, supra
note 5, at 265.
22. Phillips G. & 0. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 213 Pa. 183, 62 Atl. 830 (igo6);
Gandy v. Weckerly, 220 Pa. 285, 69 Atl. 858 (19o8).
23. Croyle v. Cambria Land & Imp. Co.; Potter v. Grimm; Yinger v. Youngman, all
supra note 29.
24. Thorne v. Warfflein, ioo Pa. 519 (1882) ; Thompson v. Schoch; Miller v. Wise, both
supra note 17; Humbert v. Myers, 279 Pa. 171, 123 Atl. 733 (2924).
25. White v. Black, 14 Pa. Super. 459 (90oo) ; see Keller v. Cohen, 217 Pa. 522, 527, 66
At. 862, 863 (1907).
26. See Becker v. Second Active Building Ass'n, 239 Pa. 590, 594, 86 At. x084, IO85
(1913).
27. Potter v. Grimm, 248 Pa. 440, 94 Atl. 185 (1915).
28. Evans v. Edelstein, 276 Pa. 516, 12o Atl. 473 (1923).
29. Homewood People's Bank v. Heckert, 207 Pa. 231, 56 Atl. 431 (1903).
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such as would normally be included by ordinary persons coming to such agree-
ment, since it dealt with the same subject matter as the written contract, which
was complete and unambiguous. Under such circumstances, the contempora-
neous agreement was admissible only in case of fraud, accident, or mistake."0
In 1924, in the midst of this distressing confusion, came Gianni v. Russell
& Co. Defendant had leased part of his premises to plaintiff for the sale of
"fruit, candy, soda water, etc.". Defendant subsequently leased another portion
of the premises to a drug company which sold soda water. Plaintiff sued de-
fendant for breach of an alleged oral, contemporaneous, inducing agreement
that plaintiff should have the exclusive right to sell soda, in consideration of a
covenant contained in the lease that he would not sell tobacco. The trial court
admitted the oral evidence. In a clear opinion by Mr. Justice Schaffer, the
Supreme Court reversed and entered absolute judgment for defendant, for the
reason that, the contract appearing complete within itself, it could be conclu-
sively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties was reduced to writ-
ing. The test of completeness was held to be whether, by comparing the oral
with the written agreement, the court would conclude that parties situated as
were the ones to the contract, would naturally and normally include the one in
the other if it were made. If the particular element of the alleged extrinsic
negotiation is dealt with at all in the writing, presumably the writing was meant
to represent all of the transaction on that element. In such case the terms of
the writing may not be added to nor subtracted from in absence of fraud, acci-
dent, or mistake. Here, the oral testimony was not offered to alter, vary, add
to, or contradict the lease, for the oral agreement-not the lease-was being
sued upon. Yet, since the lease was in evidence, the court held that it pre-
cluded oral testimony. The single feature lacking in the opinion was the failure
to repudiate earlier decisions. Three prior decisions which were in accord with
the principles expressed in the opinion were cited for the statement that "we
have stated on several occasions that we propose to stand for the integrity of
written instruments . . . We reiterate our position in this regard".
The decisions since Gianni v. Russell have leaned heavily upon this opinion.
Each decision adds a new stone to the solid Gianini foundation. And yet, the
courts have persistently refused to disown the earlier cases, although they are
invariably cited in the briefs of counsel. As will be shown later, only four cases
have discussed the older decisions; two have unsuccessfully tried to distinguish
them; the other two have tangentially repudiated their doctrines. It is the
author's purpose herein to show that the old order of cases has been at least
inferentially overruled in the decade since Gianni v. Russell.3'
That the "broader rule" above referred to is extinct does not even merit
discuss-on. The opinions go out of their way to repudiate the theory that breach
of a future promise is fraud. Again and again the Gianni case is followed in
enunciating the rule that if the alleged oral agreement or promise is of the kind
which would normally be included in the written one by parties coming to such
agreement, the oral testimony in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake,
is inadmissible, no matter how clearly it might have been matter of induce-
ment.8 2 The same rule obtains although the oral testimony would only "vary
30. Hamilton v. Fleck, 249 Pa. 6o7, 95 At. 252 (1915).
31. An earlier decision during the same year in which Gianni v. Russell was decided held
that an oral, contemporaneous, inducing promise was admissible to contradict a writing al-
though the oral agreement did not relate to the use to which the writing would be put. Hum-
bert v. Myers, 279 Pa. 171, 123 Atl. 733 (1924).
32. In addition to the cases cited infra, see Emmanuel v. Hughes, 295 Pa. 492, 145 AtI.
586 (1929).
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in part", and not entirely nullify, the written agreement, 33 or where it would
merely "add to" the writing terms which are not included therein, but which
would normally be included in such agreement.3
It appears clear, too, that an attempt to show an oral agreement respecting
the use to which the writing shall be put is equally unavailing. Thus, oral tes-
timony that an assignment by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, absolute
on its face, was in fact a transfer for security only; 85 or that defendant accepted
trade acceptances merely to enable plaintiff to use them as evidence of indebt-
edness with banks, and that plaintiff orally promised to lift them at maturity
if defendant were unable to pay; 36 or that a co-maker of a promissory note
signed only to "fix things up for the bank examiners", and that he was not to
be held personally liable 37--have all been rejected. The last mentioned case,
First National Bank v. Sagerson, is one of the two above-mentioned which have
intimated that the earlier cases were not good law:
"Despite what was said in early Pennsylvania cases, it has been stated,
and we now repeat, that a breach of faith or of an agreement regarding
the doing or refraining from doing something in the future is not
fraud. . . ."s
Offers to prove an oral agreement that one who appears to be absolutely liable
on a written instrument is only to be liable on a contingency, or that the obliga-
tion should not be considered binding or enforceable, have met similar fates.
Under this principle fall cases involving an attempt by a surety to show that
he was to be liabe only when put in funds by the principal obligor,-' or by a
co-obligor on a bond to show that she was in fact a guarantor only, the obligee
orally promising not to proceed against her until the co-obligors' collateral was
exhausted.4" Professor Wigmore points out that oral agreements which show
that there was never to be any liability under a contract-such as evidence that
a deed was never delivered, or testimony that a prima. facie commercial obli-
gation was only for the accommodation of the now plaintiff-are universally
admitted since the parol evidence rule presupposes the existence of a valid
contract, and, if it can be shown that no contractual intent existed, the parol
evidence rule is not to be considered." Pennsylvania courts recognize the prin-
ciple that one may show by parol that an instrument which purports to be his
contract is not in fact so.12 Wigmore is careful to distinguish the cases where
the oral agreement tends to show that no consummation of their conduct as a
jural act was intended by the parties until the happening of a condition prece-
33. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315, 166 Atl. 844
(1933) (attempt to show oral agreement on part of mortgagee to release from lien of
mortgage part of the lots subject thereto upon payment of specified sum). A fortiori does
the rule apply where the oral evidence is "directly contradictory". International Fuel Service
Corp. v. Stearns. 304 Pa. 157, 155 Atl. 285 (931).
34. Laurel Hill Collieries v. Benjamin, 303 Pa. 110, 154 Atl. 312 (1931) (attempt to
show set-off not included in the writing) ; Hoesch v. Freedman, lO9 Pa. Super. 503, 167 At.
256 (1933) (attempt to show oral warranty) ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Super. 458 (1925),
(1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 181 (attempt to show that leased premises were larger than
stated in lease) ; Russell v. Sickles, 3o6 Pa. 586, 16o Atl. 61o (1932) (attempt by employer to
show that under a written agreement that employee should share in net profits there was also
oral agreement that he should share losses) semble.
35. Gill's Estate, 314 Pa. 558, 171 Atl. 457 (934).
36. Architectural Tile Co. v. McSorley, 311 Pa. 299. 166 Atl. 913 (1033).
37. First National Bank v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, 129 Atl. 333 (1925).
38. Id. at 411, 129 Atl. at 335. (Italics the writer's.)
39. Warner Co. v. North City Trust Co., 311 Pa. I, 166 Atl. 230 (I933).
40. Citizens National Bank v. Wisecarver, 300 Pa. 6o, 15o Atl. io3 (1930).
41. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2408-2410, 2435.
42. Marks v. Feldman, 92 Pa. Super. 390 (1927).
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dent, from those in which the oral testimony relates to a condition qualifying the
operation of a written obligation. The latter type of agreement is of course
ineffective, since an absolute obligation is plainly exclusive of a condition. He
then admits that the distinction becomes at times, a subtle and shadowy one. 3
The Pennsylvania cases cited in this paragraph seem to be of the latter type, in
which event their holdings would not be in conflict with Professor Wigmore's
views. It may well be questioned whether Pennsylvania courts would recognize
this distinction, however, 44 in view of the apparent modern tendency "to stand
for the integrity of written instruments".
In refusing to admit oral evidence restricting the payee of a promissory
note to payment from a particular fund, the use of certain dicta in two recent
cases has been the unfortunate result of an attempt to distinguish or explain
Gandy v. Weckerly,43 one of the earlier cases. In that case, a defendant, sued
as maker on a promissory note, offered to prove an oral, contemporaneous,
inducing agreement that the payee should look for reimbursement only to the
proceeds of a note which the payee had given to defendant. The Supreme Court
held that the refusal to admit the evidence constituted reversible error, since the
oral testimony was admissible to show that the payee was attempting to make
a "fraudulent use" of the instrument. In Myers v. Gibson,40 decided in i931,
the maker of a promissory note attempted to defeat the payee's suit by offering
to show an oral agreement that the payee should look to payment solely from
collateral security transferred by the maker to the payee, i. e., that he was to be
reunbursed only from a particular fund. The Supreme Court correctly held
that the admission of the testimony was erroneous. But the opinion then con-
tinued:
"[The facts in the instant case] show that the case of Gandy v. Weck-
erly is not in point. There the facts set up a particular fund from which
payment was to be made." 47
And in United States Nat. Bank v. Evans,48 on similar facts, an oral agreement
that the payee should receive another note from a third party, the maker's note
to be used only as collateral security, was held inadmissible squarely under
Giamni v. Russell, since fraud, accident, or mistake had not been shown. Then:
"A different rule would be applied had the facts come within the prin-
ciple set forth in Gandy v. Weckerly, supra, and similar decisions, or if
there had been an averment and proof that the obligation was to be paid
from an actually existing fund . . . "49
43. 5 WIGMORE, EVDEzNCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2435. For an excellent discussion of the rea-
sons for more freely admitting oral evidence in cases involving negotiable instruments, see
§§ 2443-2445. In order that negotiability be unimpaired, certain things must not appear in the
instrument. And most of the terms of the obligation are impliedly annexed by law. Yet,
the parties may wish to use a negotiable instrument because of one or more of its specific
attributes, but may wish also to modify for their own purposes some of the generic conse-
quences ordinarily implied as a part of the whole. Professor Wigmore therefore advocates
the admissibility of extrinsic agreements regarding the fixed or implied terms of the obliga-
tion, providing it appears that the use of a negotiable instrument was essential or peculiarly
convenient for a part of the transaction, and that for another part of the transaction a dif-
ferent contract would be feasible and consistent. See also, Note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 442.
44. Cf. First National Bank v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, 329 Atl. 333 (0925), in which a
co-maker of a note was not permitted to show an oral agreement with the payee that his sig-
nature was only to "fix things up for the bank examiners", and that he was not to be held
personally liable; and Horwath v. Simon, 95 Pa. Super. 410 (1928), in which one who signed
a building contract as absolute obligor was not permitted to show an oral agreement that he
signed only as agent, his undisclosed principal to be the only one liable.
45. 220 Pa. 285, 69 Atl. 858 (i9o8).
46. 3o4 Pa. 249, I55 AtI. 563 (93).
47. Id. at 253, 155 At. at 564. (Italics the writer's.)
48. 296. Pa. 541, 146 Atl. 126 (1929).
49. Id. at 550, 146 Atl. at 129 (1929).
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Mr. justice Schaffer concurred in result, but found himself unable to agree with
the court's interpretation of Gaudy v. Weckerly, and cases which followed it.
"In my view, the rule there announced is in conflict with that established by our
later cases . . ." Such attempts by the Court to reconcile conflicting opin-
ions in earlier Pennsylvania cases is not only impossible, but leads to a labyrinth
of judicial confusion as well. In Mr. Justice Schaffer's brief concurring opin-
ion appears the only expression in the Supreme Court which squarely questions
the validity of the rule in such cases as Gandy z. 1Veckerly in the face of recent
contrary decisions involving almost identical facts. Fidelity T. & T. Co. v.
Garland" and Speier v. Michelson" are in accord with the holdings of the
Myers and Evans cases, but no dicta are indulged in, the court being content to
rely on Gianni v. Russell. If future cases will follow the decisions of these
four cases, and ignore the dicta, there will be no danger of a revival of the
Gandy case, since the factual situations are clearly identical with that case,
and the decisions are as clearly contra.
That patol evidence is admissible to show a greater consideration than that
expressed in a written contract was, in effect, the holding in Cridge's Estate."
Plaintiffs had been C's lessees. They subsequently agreed to take title to the
premises, under an informal contract providing for the payment to C of $1500
cash, $50 per month with interest at four per cent., and when $5ooo had been
paid, a deed was to be delivered and a mortgage in a large amount given for
the balance of the purchase price. C died, and plaintiffs sued for specific per-
formance of an alleged oral agreement by C to devise the property to them at
his death, and that all payments under the contract were to cease at his death.
C in fact devised the property to the defendant. The court admitted the oral
evidence and granted specific performance for two reasons: (I) that the true
consideration may always be shown to be different from that expressed in the
written contract, hence the evidence was admissible to show failure of consid-
eration; (2) the written contract did not contain the complete agreement of the
parties. Moreover, the court purported to adopt Gianni v. Russell in its en-
tirety And yet, that case held without merit the contention that the oral agree-
ment affected the consideration. The court stressed the fact that, since plaintiffs
were to pay so small an amount each month, it would have taken one hundred
years to pay off the principal. But, the novelty of the contract is not sufficient
to admit oral evidence. And, under the test laid down in Gianni v. Russell, the
court might well have found that the written contract was complete on its face,
in that such agreement to devise would normally be included in the writing.
Two later cases appear to strip Cridge's Estate of significance as a precedent.
In Bryant v. Bryant" plaintiff accepted a sum of money from his co-legatees
in consideration of his written receipt stating that he would not contest a will.
He later sued the co-legatees on an alleged oral contemporaneous promise that
he would be paid additional sums. The Supreme Court held that he was pre-
cluded by his written receipt. Here was clearly an attempt to show a greater
consideration. And, in Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph," the recitation "in consid-
eration of $i to me in hand paid" in an unsealed instrument, was held to estop
the one reciting such fact from introducing parol evidence that the considera-
tion was not received. While the last-mentioned case has been adversely criti-
50. 291 Pa. 297, 139 Atl. 876 (1927).
51. 303 Pa. 66, 154 Atl. 127 (193).
52. 289 Pa. 331, 137 Atl. 455 (1927). This case is criticized in Harrison, Admissibility
of Parol Evidence to Alter Recital of Consideration (1928) 2 TE.!PLE L. Q. 217.
53- 295 Pa. 146, 144 Atl. 9o4 (1929). A case decided prior to Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph
cxcluded oral evidence of a greater consideration squarely under Gianni v. Russell. Crick v.
Paull, 287 Pa. 431, 135 Atl. 103 (1926).
54. 301 Pa. 502, 153 Atl. 438 (1930).
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cized as enforcing a promise which lacks one of the essential elements of a valid
contract,55 it illustrates the extent to which the pendulum has swung in Penn-
sylvania in denying legal effect to oral agreements when a writing is introduced
in evidence. If Cridge's Estate and Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph are both good
law in Pennsylvania, a curious picture is presented: parol evidence is inadmissi-
ble to vary a recital of fact expressed as consideration, but admissible to vary
the terms of a promise recited as consideration-in direct contradiction to the
rule in the great majority of jurisdictions, which admit the former and exclude
the latter.5 6 It would seem more logical to suppose, however, that the more
recent Rudolph case represents a complete repudiation of the court's position
in Cridge's Estate. Such repudiation is eminently desirable, for where the par-
ties deliberately and carefully express a consideration in a written instrument,
the certainty demanded in commercial transactions should exclude the possibility
that contradictory terms may be introduced under the guise of "proving the
true consideration". If the oral promises are sufficiently material "to affect
the consideration", such terms are of sufficient importance to be included in the
writing by reasonably prudent men. A modification of the principle of the
Rudolph case, in turn, to meet Professor Williston's criticism that the appli-
cation of the parol evidence rule to recitals of fact creates a formal obligation
hitherto unknown5 7 will bring Pennsylvania into full accord with the majority
view.
Several miscellaneous types of cases have arisen since Gianni v. Russell
which are worthy of notice. Parol evidence to rebut an implication of law,
e. g., "to change, affect, or lessen, the legal liability occasioned by the manner
in which names are placed on commercial paper", is inadmissible. 8  And, the
oral agreement which would normally be included in the written contract is not
made admissible merely because the writing is not directly in issue. A direct
action will fail if based upon the parol promise or agreement; 50 and an indirect
action of deceit will not lie for breach of a future promise. 0 Of course, the
parol evidence rule applies with full force to unilateral contracts."1 But, since
the writing must be of a contractual nature, letters 02 and receipts 3 are not
ordinarily within this rule, although if it is shown that a receipt contains the
complete agreement between the parties, oral evidence is inadmissible.61
A discussion of the modern parol evidence rule would be incomplete without
reference to the principal types of recent decisions in which oral evidence has been
quite properly admitted. Where the testimony shows that there has been mate-
rial misrepresentation of past or present facts-true "fraud"--the evidence is
clearly admissible. 5 By the same token, oral evidence is admissible to show
mutual mistake on the part of the contracting parties."0 But it has been held
55. (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1139. See also i WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § ii~b.
56. I WILLISTO , CONTRACTS (1924) § II5b; 5 WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2433,
and cases therein cited.
57. I WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § i5b.
58. Pender v. Cook, 300 Pa. 468, i5o Atl. 892 (i93O).
59. Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 At. 791 (1924) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 295 Pa.
146, x44 Atl. 904 (1929) ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Super. 458 (1925).
6o. See Purcell v. Binns, 298 Pa. 447, 452, 148 Atl. 516, 517 (1930).
61. Vagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579, 136 At]. 847 (1927).
62. Garrison v. Salkind, 285 Pa. 265, 132 Atd. 125 (1926).
63. Bole v. Alden Park Manor, 98 Pa. Super. 65 (i929).
64. Bryant v. Bryant, 295 Pa. 146, 144 Atl. 904 (1929).
65. Feuerstein v. New Century Realty Co., 304 Pa. 271, 156 Atl. 11o (193I).
66. Roberts v. Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 159 Atl. 87o (1932) ; Allinger v. Melvin, 315 Pa.
298, 172 AtL. 712 (1934). The same rule would obtain to individual mistake known to or in-
duced by the other party. 5 WMMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2416.
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that in order to admit oral evidence, the evidence must be that of two wit-
nesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances."
Parol evidence is admissible to explain an ambiguity in the writing. s And
in such cases, fraud, accident, or mistake need not be shown-the purpose of
the oral testimony is not to show that the actual agreement is different from the
writing, but merely to elucidate the meaning of the parties.69 But an ambi-
guity, to admit of parol testimony, must be one which is reasonably open to two
constructions; fanciful ambiguities will not be found to provide a subterfuge
by which to admit parol evidence."0
Where a written contract refers to or incorporates an oral agreement, so
that the verbal conversation is part of the entire transaction, oral evidence is
admissible on the theory that the writing is incomplete on its face. '1 It is impor-
tant to note that in one situation the ordinary rules for determining "complete-
ness" as enunciated in Gianni v. Russell do not apply: it is always competent to
show an extrinsic agreement by the admissions of the party attempting to stand
on the instrument as written.72  If, on cross-examination, such party acknowl-
edges the existence of an oral agreement, the evidence will be ipso facto ad-
mitted--"The parol evidence rule exists not for reasons of public policy but
to protect those who put their entire contracts in writing . . . "."' Under this
rule, an admirable safeguard is provided for all situations in which a prima facie
complete writing appears in evidence. Since the party relying on the writing
will be the key to the admission of the testimony, perjury is made the price of
injustice, if in fact an extrinsic agreement existed. For those who contend that
this safeguard is apparent only, since it is an easy matter for a witness to deny
the existence of a parol agreement, it may well be observed that if our major
premise is that witnesses will perjure themselves, it matters little what the law
may be.
A written contract, whether sealed or unsealed, may be modified by a sub-
sequent oral agreement, 4 provided that the oral agreement is supported by valid
consideration. ' 5 In such case, the evidence must show that the parties clearly
67. See Fuller v. Law, 2o7 Pa. IOI, 56 Atl. 333 (19o3) ; Pender v. Cook, 3oo Pa. 468,
15o Atl. 892 (193o) ; Keller v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Io Pa. Super. 240 (899).
68. Schwartz v. Whelan, 295 Pa. 425, 145 Atl. 525 (1929) ; Fleming v. Klein, IOO Pa.
Super. 40 (193o) ; Kane v. McClenachan, 3O4 Pa. Super. 417, 159 Atl. 61 (i3i).
69. Lever v. Lagomarsino, 282 Pa. 110, 127 Atl. 452 (1925) ; Simon v. Myers, 284 Pa. 3,
13o Atl. 256 (1925).
70. Anstead v. Cook, 291 Pa. 335, 14o Atl. 139 (3927) ; Home Bldg. and Savings Co. v.
Ruthrauff, 295 Pa. 237, 145 Atl. 129 (1929); Goldbacher v. United Automobile Service
Corp., IOO Pa. Super. i8 (193o).
71. Huessener v. Fishel & Mark Co., 281 Pa. 535, 127 Atl. 139 (0924) ; C. D. Brown &
Co. v. Standard Hide Co., 303 Pa. 543, 152 At!. 557 (930).
72. Ward v. Zeigler, 285 Pa. 557, 132 At]. 798 (1926), adversely criticized (1926) 74 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 747; Newland v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 315 Pa. 193, 173 Atl. 822 (934). It
is on this ground alone that the recent decision of Friend v. Kuhn, 316 Pa. 233 (1934), is
sustainable. Plaintiff, payee of a promissory note, sued defendant as endorser. Defendant
alleged in her affidavit of defense an oral agreement with plaintiff that her endorsement was a
mere formality, and that she should not be held personally liable. The court affirmed a dis-
charge of plaintiff's rule for judgment for want of sufficient affidavit of defense, on the
theory that the parol evidence rule was prematurely argued on a question of pleading. It is
submitted that the court contemplated the possibility of plaintiff's admitting the truth of de-
fendant's allegations at trial, for the affidavit would otherwise be insufficient, since the oral
agreement could not be shown in absence of such admission.
73. Ward v. Zeigler, 285 Pa. 557, 560, 132 Atl. 798, 799 (1926). It is therefore apparent
that in Pennsylvania the parol evidence rule is a rule of evidence merely and not one of sub-
stantive law. See 5 WIGNMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2400.
74. Tomlinson v. Wilson, 310 Pa. 41, 164 Atl. 721 (0933).
75. See Tradesmen's National Bank v. Cummings Bros. Co., 306 Pa. 280, 282, 159 Att.
452, 453 (3932).
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intended to modify, alter,. or change the writing,7" and unless the language of
the oral agreement is stated in the pleadings, plaintiff may obtain judgment for
want of sufficient affidavit of defense-a bald assertion of a legal conclusion
that "plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement that plaintiff should
look only to the fund derived from the future sale of lots", is insufficient.
77
Where the oral agreement is properly shown, the mutual unexecuted undertak-
ings of the existing written contract are a sufficient consideration for the can-
cellation of such contract and a substitution of the oral one.", It is also un-
controverted that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable to strangers to the
written contract."0 Of course, the rule applies with as much force to those
claiming under or through the contracting parties as to the original parties them-
selves."'
The cases decided since Gianni v. Russell seem to sustain the Supreme
Court's statement in Speier v. Michelson that the dead wood has been definitely
cut away from the parol evidence rule as reflected in earlier Pennsylvania cases.
Beginning as it did with false premises, and persisting long after the foundation
of the rule had disintegrated, the "Pennsylvania exception" and its corollary
refinements appear to be definitely things of the past. The courts have recog-
nized the necessity for taking a stand either for or against written instruments-
that exceptions, once recognized, are sufficiently plastic to be readily molded to
fit all situations, with the result that a written contract is enforced in the excep-
tional, rather than the usual, case. It is not good law which allows commercial
transactions to rest upon the slippery memory of witnesses, especially when the
evidence, coming from the parties themselves, is so likely to be biased. And,
since persons entering into written agreements do so for the very purpose of
removing doubt and uncertainty, courts should aid them in effectuating their
purpose. No valid reason generally exists for permitting oral, contemporaneous
promises or agreements to be shown to modify a writing-the more weight the
oral matter may have had in inducing the execution of the writing, the more
imperative are the reasons for its inclusion by prudent men. The corrective
tendency of the Supreme and Superior Courts in the recent decisions has aligned
Pennsylvania with the majority of jurisdictions, and at least one case has gone
beyond orthodox concepts in the new enthusiasm for excluding oral testimony.8
It is extremely improbable that this line of authority will ever again be supplanted
by the old order of cases, despite unfortunate dicta in a few opinions.
H.S.R.
76. Knight v. Gulf Refining Co., 311 Pa. 357, i66 Atl. 88o (1933).
77. Price, Inc. v. Robbins, 298 Pa. 568, 148 Atl. 849 (1930).
78. Himeles v. Rose, 84 Pa. Super. 363 (1925).
79. Collins v. Herwick, iog Pa. Super. 413, 67 Att. 474 (933).
8o. Title Holding Co. v. Black, 3o6 Pa. 352, i59 Atl. 56o (1932) ; see Roberts v. Cauf-
fiel, 283 Pa. 64, 68, 128 Atl. 67o, 671 (1925).
Si. Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph, 301 Pa. 502, 153 At. 438 (930).
